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MARKING THE PATH OF THE LAW
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Collaborative
Learning, New York Law School. This article was first presented as a keynote
address to the Society of Law Teachers of Southern Africa conference in
Pietermaritzburg, in July 2009, and I thank Michael Kidd, Managay Reddi and the
other organisers and participants in that conference. I’m also grateful to Chris
Mbazira for his comments, and to the other participants in the Constitutional
Court Review conference in December 2009; and to the colleagues and students
who attended a New York Law School faculty workshop in January 2010 at which I
presented the paper as well. I also thank Judge Azhar Cachalia for his thoughtful
comments, and Keith Harden for valuable research assistance. Finally, Robert
Blecker’s extensive written comments were a gift exemplifying collegiality.
Stephen Ellmann*
1 Introduction
In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, Chaskalson P said for the Court: 
There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is
the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its
force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.1
In 15 years, South Africa’s Constitutional Court — and the judges of
the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Courts — have traversed
most of the history of US constitutional law, a history that took us two
centuries to compile, and have marked out new ground of their own:
abolition of the death penalty; recognition of free speech; judicial
intervention in foreign relations; administrative justice; equal rights
under law for blacks and whites, gays and straights, men and women;
rights of public participation in legislative processes; and the
progressive realisation of socioeconomic rights. To an American
observer, it is a remarkable list: and to an American liberal observer,
not much short of miraculous.
We have arrived at an important moment in this already illustrious
constitutional tradition. Four distinguished justices have just left the
1 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In re Ex Parte
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2002 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44.
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Constitutional Court, and the President who appointed their
replacements came to office amidst controversy and litigation that
certainly raised concerns about the future position of the judiciary. It
seems right for us to use this moment to consider what it is that South
Africans (and Americans) should seek and value in constitutional
judges, and how we, as law professors, can contribute to finding what
we seek.
Just over a hundred years ago, one of the great justices of the
United States Supreme Court, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Junior,
addressed such questions. Holmes remains a powerful influence in US
constitutional law, known above all for his resistance to the Supreme
Court’s efforts to block modernising social reform legislation in the
early 20th Century and for his contributions to the beginnings of our
free speech jurisprudence. But when he gave his speech on ‘The path
of the law,’ in 1897, he had not yet begun that great work.2 
He began with words whose skeptical tone can still be felt today.
He had no patience with the idea that law was the ineluctable logical
conclusion from some simple set of moral propositions, and instead he
said that ‘the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by law.’3 If law is nothing
more than some predictions about judicial behavior, we have no basis
to say that some lawmaking is better than other lawmaking — we must
just get busy on making our predictions. 
But that clearly is not Holmes’ ultimate position.4 After suggesting
that it would be ‘a gain if every word of moral significance could be
banished from the law altogether,’5 and pointing to the ‘danger’ of
‘the notion that a given system, ours, for instance, can be worked out
like mathematics from some general axioms of conduct,’6 he makes
plain that he views judicial decisions as resting on ‘a judgment as to
the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds.’7
What he would like judges to do, therefore, is to acknowledge that
they are making such judgments,8 and to make them on the basis of
a better knowledge of society — notably, statistics and economics9 —
than they had till then possessed. 
2 OW Holmes ‘The path of the law’ (1997) 110 Harvard Law Review 991 (first
published 1897).
3 Holmes (n 3 above) at 994. 
4 See RW Gordon ‘The path of the lawyer’ (1997) 110 Harvard Law Review 1013,
1014.
5 Holmes (n 3 above) 997. 
6 Holmes (n 3 above). 
7 Holmes (n 3 above). 
8 Holmes (n 3 above) 999.
9 Holmes (n 3 above) 1001, 1005.
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This is a picture of the judge as social policymaker, and indeed
that image captured the imagination of many American lawyers and
judges in the ensuing decades. Yet it is not, after all, quite what
Holmes is describing. Here is his explanation of ‘[t]he way to gain a
liberal view of your subject’ — ‘not to read something else, but to get
to the bottom of the subject itself.’
The means of doing that are, in the first place, to follow the existing
body of dogma into its highest generalisation by the help of
jurisprudence; next, to discover from history how it has come to be what
it is; and, finally, so far as you can, to consider the ends which the
several rules seek to accomplish, the reasons why those ends are
desired, what is given up to gain them, and whether they are worth the
price.10 
From such work — very much the work of the scholar rather than the
practitioner, as another reader of Holmes, William Simon, has pointed
out11 — will come, presumably, better decisions and better law. But
something more as well: 
The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give it
universal interest. It is through them that you not only become a great
master in your calling, but connect your subject with the universe and
catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a
hint of the universal law.12
It does not seem unfair to say that in this final passage Holmes is
aspiring not just to tremendous intellectual mastery but to wisdom as
well. When Holmes wrote those words, US constitutional tradition was
more than a century old, but the rise of a human rights-focused
constitutional law, to which Holmes himself would contribute, still lay
in the future. We now, and you now, live in a constitutional world
shaped by jurists who have built the sphere of constitutional liberties
far beyond what their predecessors might have envisaged. My task is
to discuss the path of the law today. I hope to catch an echo of the
infinite, or at least of the vastly rich and valuable finite — though we
will not follow the same path as the one that Justice Holmes
proposed.
2 The path of constitutional law
Let us begin with Brown v Board of Education.13 In a sense, modern
American constitutional law as a whole begins with Brown; to reject
10 Holmes (n 3 above) 1007.
11 See WH Simon The practice of justice: A theory of lawyers’ ethics (1998) 120-21,
128. 
12 Holmes (n 3 above) 1009. 
13 Brown v Board of Education (1954) 347 US 483.
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Brown is simply to reject modern US constitutional law. Indeed, to
reject Brown is to reject the understanding of racial equality that is
now, more or less, the view of the entire world. 
To understand Brown’s significance, however, we need to do
more than recognise the centrality of its result to the world we know
today. We also need to consider the way the Supreme Court reached
its decision.
The central problem facing the Supreme Court was that neither
precedent, text, nor original intentions clearly supported the result.
As to precedent, Brown had to overrule a 50-year-old Supreme Court
decision approving what came to be known as ‘separate but equal’
racial segregation.14 As to text, the Fourteenth Amendment secures
the ‘equal protection’ of the laws,15 but it could be argued — it had
been the law — that the races are equally protected if each is
segregated from the other. And, most importantly, as to original
intention: the point has since been contested,16 but there is at least
considerable evidence that that the people who adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment were not as anti-racist as one might like to
believe. It is possible to view the intentions of the amendment’s
adopters broadly and abstractly, as a repudiation of unjust racial
discrimination. Concretely and specifically, however, the great
American law scholar Alexander Bickel, fresh from clerking for Justice
Felix Frankfurter during the term in which Brown was first argued, in
1955 came to what he called the ‘obvious conclusion’ that
section 1 of the fourteenth amendment … carried out the relatively
narrow objectives of the Moderates [in Congress], and hence, as
originally understood, was meant to apply neither to jury service, nor
suffrage, nor anti-miscegenation statutes, nor segregation.17
Thus the task for the Brown Court — the task as the Court seems to
have seen it — was not the careful marshalling of the conventional
materials of legal analysis. If anything, the task was the opposite — to
explain the appropriateness of making a decision on a fundamentally
different ground. The Court did so, as Bickel says, first by arguing that
14 Plessy v Ferguson (1896) 163 US 537. 
15 ‘[N]or shall any State … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.’ US Constitution Amendment XIV.
16 See MW McConnell ‘Originalism and the desegregation decisions’ (1995) 81
Virginia Law Review 947; MJ Klarman ‘Brown, originalism, and constitutional
theory: A response to Professor McConnell’ (1995) 81 Virginia L Rev 1881; MW
McConnell ‘The originalist justification for Brown: A reply to Professor Klarman’
(1995) 81 Virginia Law Review 1937 (1995).
17 AM Bickel ‘The original understanding and the segregation decision’ (1955) 69
Harvard Law Review 1, 58. 
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the original intentions of the adopters were unclear and then by
saying they were irrelevant.18 Chief Justice Warren wrote:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of
its full development and its present place in American life throughout
the nation.19
Then the Court offered, very much as Justice Holmes had urged in
‘The path of the law’, a sociological/psychological assessment of the
central role of education in American life and the harm that
segregation of schools did to black children.20 
It soon turned out, however, that the central role of education in
American life was not the ultimate basis for the Court’s rejection of
segregation. We know this ‘truth’ about the judgment because within
a few years other cases, decided without elaboration, applied the
Brown rule to segregation in other parts of American life that clearly
were not equally central to the shaping of young lives, eg, parks and
buses.21 It seems plain in hindsight that the Court’s statement that ‘in
the field of public education the doctrine of “separate but equal” has
no place’22 was not the whole of what the Court had come to believe:
they decided, in fact, that ‘separate but equal’ had no place in
American public life whatsoever.
In short, Brown did not rest on careful elaboration of doctrinal
legal arguments. Nor, indeed, did it rest on elaborate argument at all
— the unanimous opinion is just over 10 pages long. Yet it is the
touchstone of American constitutional law. It is deeply, morally right.
But the decision is settled law, I believe, because the Court felt and
somewhat imprecisely gave voice to a fundamental judgment of value
— a judgment that came to be accepted by the American people (I do
not think it is clear at all that the American people would have
embraced it in 1954) and that we are the fortunate inheritors thereof. 
Brown is a very special case, and what is true of Brown may not
be true of all constitutional law, American or South African. But if it
is, as Brown suggests, a central task of constitutional judges to
articulate and give effect to the values that should govern a society,
then, as we will see, we can say quite a bit about what the distinctive
virtues of the judges performing this task ought to be. 
18 Bickel (n 18 above) 1-2.
19 Brown (n 14 above) 492-93.
20 Holmes (n 18 above) 493-94. 
21 See, eg, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v Dawson 350 US 877 (1955) (public
beaches and bathhouses).
22 Brown (n 14 above) 495.
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I propose to discuss the following questions that begin from this
starting point:
First, what are the respective roles of lawyerly skills, and
constitutional values, in constitutional judging?
Second, can we specify the values to which judges should be
committed?
Third, can the presence of emotion, linked to values, in decision-
making jeopardise impartial judgment?
Fourth, can empathy insure fair judging? Or can we turn to
practical wisdom, conceived as a melding of sympathy and
detachment? Or should we emphasise the converse of empathy,
independence?
And, fifth, if constitutional judging is inevitably and rightly shaped
by commitments to values which may vary widely, and by emotions
that inevitably both support committed decision-making and risk
over-commitment, what can judges do to stay this difficult course?
This essay seeks to understand the nature of judging, as
understood by the Constitutional Court, rather than to critique
particular doctrinal decisions handed down by the Constitutional
Court in 2008. As we will see, many of the cases decided by the Court
in 2008 do shed light on the answers to these questions. I will look to
these cases repeatedly, but above all I will try to fully take account
of the striking perspectives revealed in the Constitutional Court’s
decision in perhaps its most politically fraught case of the year, Thint
v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others.23
First, what is the relation of skills to values?
It has been some years now, but I recall attending another conference
in South African law at which I think a speaker, a very incisive and
perceptive one, asserted that the highest virtue of a constitutional
law judge was technical skill. This proposition, I believe, is mistaken.
Certainly technical skill is a great asset, probably an essential
one. But let us imagine a judge who is the acknowledged, preeminent
master of every tool of legal reasoning but who believes that the
fundamental premises of the legal system which he or she serves are
bankrupt. Is it possible that such a judge would be the best choice to
render decisions about how those premises apply to particular
23 Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2008 12
BCLR 1197 (CC).
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controversies? We know that the framers of the post-apartheid
constitutions thought not; that, after all, was why they created the
Constitutional Court, and staffed it with judges who shared a
passionate rejection of the values of apartheid. Surely the architects
of the new Court wanted judges who would not only seem, but also
be, supporters of the new order. 
This decision rested on a sound intuition.24 I mean to cast no
aspersion on any particular judge, and I don’t assume at all that
judges who took office before the end of apartheid necessarily
rejected the premises of the post-apartheid constitution. My point is
a different one: we simply would not feel confident that a judge who
shared none of our values could apply those values soundly. How
would this judge know what really mattered to us, if none of it
mattered to him?
But don’t lawyers routinely argue for positions they don’t
themselves endorse? And don’t all of us sometimes help others to
make choices by suggesting what might make most sense on the basis
of the values of the person we are assisting, rather than our own
preferences? These familiar actions reflect that it is certainly not
necessary to share all the values of another person in order to reason
according to those values. But it is another matter, I think, to weigh
values with which one has no sympathy whatsoever. It may well be
another matter, as well, to make decisions based on such values (as a
judge does) rather than simply to employ these values to argue or to
advise another person who will make the final judgment. Even so, I do
not need to deny altogether the possibility that a judge could
accomplish this leap of reasoning and commitment. It is enough to say
that such an achievement would be remarkable, and that we have
good reason to feel, in general, that those who judge based on our
values need to actually hold them.
As it happens, neurological evidence confirms what seems like a
truism about human nature. Recent study of human decision-making
suggests that we do not, in fact, make decisions in an unemotional
manner. Antonio Damasio, in Descartes’ error,25 offers evidence that
those human beings unfortunate enough to suffer the kinds of brain
damage that cut off their cognitive processes from the neural
circuitry of emotion often wind up unable to make life decisions, or
24 Anthony Kronman urges, similarly, that lawyers cannot succeed in their necessary
task of predicting how judges will rule in their cases unless the lawyers
themselves ‘care, like a civic-minded judge, about the law’s well-being,’ for ‘the
accuracy of [the lawyer’s] predictions is in part a function of his own interest in
the good of the law itself.’ AT Kronman The lost lawyer: Failing ideals of the
legal profession (1993) 139.
25 A Damasio Descartes’ error: emotion, reason, and the human brain (2005).
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at least life decisions that shape a meaningful life.26 Presumably the
reason is that without emotions to add weight to the scale for some
arguments as against others, logic alone does not produce coherent
decisions from human minds.27 When we say that constitutional
judges should embrace the values of the constitution, the word
‘embrace’ is not entirely metaphorical: to hold a value, it appears, is
to be emotionally attached to it, and this emotional component will
be important to much of what I am about to argue. I suspect that the
judges of every era have similarly needed to base their decisions on
emotional commitments — to the rule of law, say, if no constitution
existed to bind their nation — and so I do not actually think that the
role of emotion in judging is a new development. It is to some extent
a new perception, or a newly confirmed perception. But it is, in any
event, a critical feature of constitutional judging.
What we’ve said so far, though, is simply that pure technical skill
cannot suffice to enable a judge to perform her role well. Let me take
the point a little further. Let us imagine a choice between two
candidates for judicial office. One is a superlative legal reasoner who
accepts the values of our legal system, but with little enthusiasm — a
citizen of a republic, say, who regarded popular self-government as
only faintly preferable to monarchical rule. The other is an adequate
but uninspired legal reasoner, who embodies the values of our system
in his or her life’s commitments and achievements. I would be more
comfortable, and I suspect most readers would too, with the second
candidate for the judgeship, the one we could trust to be trying with
all his heart to give effect to the values he or she shared with us. This
judge has ‘a passion for justice’ — a phrase notable for the intensity
of the emotional commitment it describes.28 The more you agree with
me on this choice, the more you are saying, as I would, that technical
skill is not the highest virtue of the judge.
Certainly Brown is evidence for the centrality of values to
constitutional judging. Some members of the 1954 Supreme Court
were superb legal reasoners, but the Brown decision makes little show
of interpretive brilliance. It rests on a judgment of morality and social
policy, and it is central to modern American constitutional law
because that judgment won acceptance from the country as a whole.
26 Damasio (n 26 above) 34-51.
27 As Judge Posner has commented: ‘Reason is not (pace Kant) motivational;
knowing what is the right thing to do must be conjoined with a desire to do the
right thing for action to result.’ RA Posner ‘Emotion versus emotionalism in law in
SA Bandes (ed) The Passions of Law 309, 310 (1999). On the role of emotions, see
D Gewirtzman ‘Our founding feelings: Emotion, commitment, and imagination in
constitutional culture’ 43 University of Richmond Law Review 623 (2009). 
28 On the ‘passion for justice,’ see SH Pillsbury ‘Harlan, Holmes, and the passions of
justice’ in SA Bandes (ed) The passions of law 330 (1999); A Sachs The strange
alchemy of life and law (2010). 
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Now one might respond, and with reason, by saying that the brief
opinion in Brown bears little resemblance to some of the long and
scholarly decisions of the Constitutional Court in particular. One
might also say, again with reason, that the brief, and mostly
centuries-old, words of the US constitution demand more value-laden
interpretation than the much more elaborately specified provisions of
South Africa’s constitution. Cases such as Weare, in which the Court
had to decide whether ‘Ordinances’ should be classified as ‘provincial
Acts,’29 or Chagi, which in part focused on parsing earlier pleadings
to determine who actually was the defendant against whom the case
had been brought,30 reflect this difference.31 One might also say that
much US constitutional interpretation is far more focused on the
application of the interpretive tools of the lawyers’ trade than Brown
was. All of this may be right, but none of it, I think, alters the basic
point: technical skill is certainly important, but it is not the highest
virtue of the constitutional judge. At the very least, sincere
commitment to the values of the legal system is also essential.
It is worth emphasising what I am not arguing here. I am not
defending imprecise reasoning. Nor am I defending reasoning that
puts aside focused legal questions in favour of broad inferences from
loosely defined constitutional values.32 Recognising the importance,
indeed the centrality, of values to constitutional judging does not
imply an embrace of values instead of arguments, or values instead of
text. Instead, my thesis is simply that as judges examine and
articulate the law, as they work through whatever issues of definition
and logic that task entails, the values they bring to the process will
make a crucial difference.
It might be maintained, however, that issues of legal precision
mark out boundaries on the legitimate play of values. Where the text
is clear, one might say, the role of the judge is to discern that, and
then proceed from there. I do not deny that the meaning of texts can
29 Weare and Another v Ndebele NO and Others 2009 4 BCLR 370 (CC).
30 Chagi and 29 Others v Special Investigating Unit 2009 3 BCLR 227 (CC)
(interpreting the meaning of a presidential proclamation).
31 See also Kruger v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 3
BCLR 268 (CC) (on whether the President could amend a mistakenly issued
Proclamation), and Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd and Others 2008 11
BCLR 1123 (CC) (on the meaning of a proviso inserted into law by the President as
part of the constitutional transition). The adoption of statutes meant precisely to
implement constitutional requirements, such as the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act 3 of 2000, brings even more elaborate textual material into the
process of constitutional adjudication in South Africa. 
32 On whether the Constitutional Court has fallen into reasoning of this sort,
compare S Woolman ‘The amazing, vanishing Bill of Rights’ (2007) 124 South
African Law Journal 762 with FI Michelman ‘On the uses of interpretive “charity”:
Some notes on application, avoidance, equality and objective unconstitutionality
from the 2007 term of the Constitutional Court of South Africa’ (2008) 1
Constitutional Court Review 1.
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be clear (at least as a practical matter). But similar sources of
meaning are not, in the end, anything like a tight boundary on the role
of values. If texts are to be interpreted purposively (as we will discuss
further in a moment), then their purposes must be discerned. To some
extent, at least, this act of discernment is better described as a
process of imputation or infusion. Statutes’ purposes should be
presumed, where reasonably possible, to be the purposes of the
constitution as well, and describing constitutional purposes is an act
of constitutional valuation. So, for instance, in Gumede, Moseneke
DCJ offers a purposive meaning of s 8(4)(a) of the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, and explains that
the Recognition Act must be given a meaning that extends optimal
protection to a category of vulnerable people who, in this case, are
women married under customary law, in order to give effect to the
equality and dignity guarantees of the Constitution. That, after all, is
the primary purpose of the Recognition Act.33
Section 39(2) of the Constitution, which calls for such value-based
interpretation of statutes, applies the same standard to development
of the common law and customary law.34 So, in Shilubana, Van der
Westhuizen J concluded that a customary law community ‘must be
empowered to itself act so as to bring its customs into line with the
norms and values of the Constitution.’35 It seems to me, in short, that
values are part of adjudication, through and through, and that we
cannot mark out any clear or general rules that would confine and
subordinate their role.36
Second, can we specify the values to which a constitutional judge 
should be committed?
South African cases declare that the constitution is to be interpreted
purposively, and that the purpose is to be discerned from a
consideration of a set of factors. A constitutional right, in particular, 
must not be construed in isolation, but in its context, which includes the
history and background to the adoption of the Constitution, other
provisions of the Constitution itself and, in particular, the provisions of
33 Gumede v President of Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 3 SA 152 (CC)
para 43.
34 Section 39(2).
35 Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa 2008 9 BCLR 914 (CC) para 73.
36 My focus here is on constitutional values. Particularly with a constitution whose
value aspirations are as sweeping as South Africa’s, a judge’s constitutional values
surely overlap with her broader moral and political convictions. There is, not
surprisingly, evidence that judges’ values, taken in this broader sense, influence
their decisions. See RA Posner How judges think (2008) 19-29. 
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Chapter 3 of which it is part. It must also be construed in a way which
secures for ‘individuals the full measure’ of its protection.37
In addition, the Constitutional Court maintains that the Constitution
embodies an ‘objective, normative value system.’38 
If there is an objective, normative value system that should guide
the purposive interpretation of the constitution, then it is obviously
essential that constitutional judges should be committed to that value
system. This raises three questions. First, is there such a thing as an
objective, normative value system? Second, if there is such a system,
should it bind South Africa’s judges? Third, if such a system exists and
is binding, how much does it specify?39 
I wish to answer the first two questions in a decidedly
nonphilosophical way. I am not certain that there exist objective,
normative values that all people can or should adhere to — at least
beyond some very modest range. But that is not the question facing
South Africa’s judges. Rather, the question is whether they have been
authoritatively directed, by the constitution, to adhere to a set of
values. This question is, as you can see, a positivist one. Positivism in
South Africa rightly got a bad name in the years of apartheid, but to
the extent that it asserts that a constitution is binding because those
who adopted it were entitled to choose how to govern themselves,
and did so, I think positivism expresses a fundamental democratic
truth. South Africa’s constitution leaves no doubt that it enjoins on
the courts and on everyone in the nation a commitment to certain
founding values, broadly reflected in the Preamble and spelled out in
some detail in Section 1. It is a wonderful thing to live under a
constitution whose text contains such clear and humane and
transformative guidance, and no cause for regret that positivism
confirms that this guidance is binding law. 
There is a further reason to see these values as binding. Perhaps
in two hundred years South Africans will look at parts of their
constitution, as originally enacted, and feel that it is essential to
reinterpret them so as to infuse them with the values of that future
day. That has certainly been a recurrent experience in the United
States, very much reflected in Brown: our constitution is extremely
37 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC).
38 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 10 BCLR 995 (CC)
para 54; Thint (n 26 above) para 375 (dissenting judgment of Ngcobo J).
39 For evidence of radically different uses of the phrase in the High Court, the
Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court, and an argument that the
notion of an ‘objective, normative value system’ serves primarily to block
charges of judicial ‘subjectivity’ (much as it does under Germany’s Basic Law),
but that it lacks discernable content, see S Woolman ‘Application’ in S Woolman,
et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd Edition, OS, December 2005)
Chapter 31.
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hard to amend, and since no set of rules or principles can encompass
the infinite possibilities of the future, many constitutional
interpreters in the US have felt that the specific original intentions of
the Framers or Adopters of the constitution should not be treated as
binding. That’s a feeling that also becomes ever more attractive as
the actual contours of those original intentions become increasingly
lost in history. With uncertain historical reference points and
changing conditions, there is good reason for constitutional
interpreters to look elsewhere for guidance in their task.
But South Africa is still much, much closer to its founding moment.
The memory of man and woman runneth easily back to 1994, or 1996.
In a broad sense, you know what you meant when you uttered a
constitution. Moreover, for better or worse, your constitution is more
readily amendable than ours, and in fact it has been amended a
number of times. The text that has stood the test of the past 15 years
can fairly be said to still mean what it was intended to mean when it
was adopted — at least as a first cut — and what was intended can still
very often be discerned. Moreover, these intentions can matter to the
decision of cases. Thus, in Mphela, Mpati AJ wrote for the
Constitutional Court that
[i]t seems to me … that where land which was the subject of a
dispossession as a result of past discriminatory laws is claimed … the
starting point is that the whole of the land should be restored, save
where restoration is not possible due to compelling public interest
considerations.40
The ‘starting point,’ drawn from constitutional values, can determine
the ending point as well. 
In short, on grounds of positivist authority and accessible basis in
original intention, South Africa does have an objective, normative
value system to guide its constitutional interpretation. The problem
is not that there is no basis for discerning such a system — the problem
is that the contours of the system are so broad. ‘Human dignity, the
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and
freedoms’41 are capacious values; sincere men and women can surely
hold, and reasonably hold, many different specific understandings of
these terms. If we seek to find particular values that are the most
fundamental — human dignity, perhaps, or equality, or
40 Mphela and 217 Others v Haakdoornbult Boerdery CC and 6 Others [2008] ZACC 5
para 32. 
41 Section 1(a).
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transformation — still the breadth of reasonable conceptions of these
concepts is still immense.42
We can see the presence, and impact, of differing understandings
of these values in a number of the Constitutional Court’s 2008
decisions. Some involve issues that on their face are quite prosaic and
technical. So, for example, in CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries,43 the
Constitutional Court had to decide whether an exemption that Tao
Ying had received from wage requirements and other aspects of the
then-applicable ‘industrial council agreement’ remained in effect
even after a ‘bargaining council agreement’ made under a new law,
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, went into operation. Answering
this question required interpretation of the exact meaning of the
terms of the exemption at issue, a matter technical enough that one
might not expect it to have constitutional content. But Justice Ngcobo
maintained, for the Court, that even if the exemption could
reasonably be read to have the meaning Tao Ying asserted (a
proposition he argued at length against), it could also reasonably be
read otherwise, and should be, because 
the meaning preferred in this judgment accords better with the values
of our Constitution. This is so because, on the facts of this case, a labour
regime that enabled the greater exploitation of black people in the
homelands as part of the apartheid scheme, to the detriment of the
workers in these areas, would, on the employer’s interpretation, be kept
in force for longer than the interpretation preferred in this judgment.44
In dissent, O’Regan J sharply criticised this argument. She argued that
the exemption had in fact been issued as a result of the Department
of Labour’s concern that without such an exemption companies would
close and jobs would be lost, and said that:
This Court should be slow to base its reasoning on such arguments [as
Ngcobo J’s], particularly when they have not been raised either by the
union or the employer, and when they are likely to mask complex social
42 Thus Marius Pieterse writes that ‘[i]n legal circles especially, the word
‘transformation’ is used to denote a wide array of processes or programmes,
ranging from affirmative action and black economic empowerment to the
complete overhaul of South African legal culture.’ M Pieterse ‘What do we mean
when we talk about transformative constitutionalism?’ (2005) 20 SAPR/PL 155,
155. He himself goes on to offer a conception of transformation, but is careful not
to ‘pretend that my understanding is the only tenable one, or that it is
necessarily correct ... That said, I nevertheless believe it useful to present an
explicit and integrated formulation of ‘constitutional transformation’, if only
constructively to inform debates on the content of its terms and on the
appropriate role for constitutional interpreters in its achievement.’ Pieterse (n 43
above) 156. Such debate is certainly constructive, but the need for it reflects the
expansive nature of the constitution’s values. 
43 2009 1 BCLR 1 (CC).
44 CUSA (n 44 above) para 103.
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and economic realities, possibly with harmful consequences, such as job
losses.45
The disagreement between Justices Ngcobo and O’Regan may not
have been about values, to be sure, but rather only46 about the
application of those values to a concrete situation. But it is also
possible that the two jurists were responding to different elements of
the Constitution’s values: Ngcobo J to its repudiation of apartheid,
O’Regan J to its protection of disadvantaged people. These values
frequently coincide, but CUSA is a case where, perhaps, they did not. 
Values play a striking role in Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo
(Pty) Ltd as well. I’ve already referred to Wary as an example of a
case that raises the kinds of technical issues that are much more like
to arise under South Africa’s detailed constitution than under the very
brief US constitution.47 But Wary demonstrates that even an intensely
technical question may, in the end, involve differing views of the
constitution’s values. Wary was a dispute over the meaning of a
proviso to the Agricultural Land Act’s definition of ‘agricultural land’,
a proviso added by President Mandela in 1995, pursuant to his
transitional constitutional authority.48 
On one reading, the majority’s, the proviso meant that land
classified as agricultural prior to the first election of local transitional
councils would remain so until reclassified by the national Minister of
Agriculture. This reading saw the proviso as aimed at meeting
the need to provide for the continued efficient carrying out of the
functional area of agriculture assigned to the Minister and the
anticipated future acquisition by a provincial government of the ability
to assume responsibility for the administration of laws falling within the
functional sphere of agriculture.49
Kroon AJ defended this interpretation as ‘attribut[ing] to the
legislature the intention to retain the national government’s role in
effectively formulating national policy on these and related issues,’50
45 CUSA (n 44 above) para 148 (dissenting judgment of O’Regan J).
46 Not that the application of values to a concrete situation is a minor matter. Stu
Woolman cites O’Regan J’s comments on this score as ‘unmistakably identify[ing]
the dangers of “thinly reasoned” reliance on the “values” — whatever they might
be — to be found in FC s 39(2).’ S Woolman ‘Between charity and clarity: Kibitzing
with Frank Michelman on how to best read the Constitutional Court’ (2010) —
SAPL/PR — (forthcoming)(Paper presented at the South Africa Reading Group, 20
November 2009, at New York Law School, on file with author). See also F
Michelman ‘Old kibitzes never die’ (2010) — SAPL/PR — (forthcoming).
47 [2008] ZACC 12.
48 Wary (n 48 above) para 12, n7. The transitional authority was conferred by s
235(9) of the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993. 
49 Wary (n 48 above) para 66.
50 Wary (n 48 above) para 80. 
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and argued that this interpretation ‘would promote the spirit, purport
and objects of the Bill of Rights,’51 specifically the right to food.52 
On the dissent’s reading, land classified as agricultural under this
proviso remained in that classification only until permanent local
authority was established. Though Yacoob J maintained that the
statutory language was so plain that no constitutional issue even
arose,53 he too found constitutional significance in the case. In his
view, to interpret the proviso to mean that the Minister retained
power over each and every sale of land within a municipality, long
after permanent local authorities had been created, was ‘inconsistent
with the restructuring, decentralisation and democratisation of
power that our Constitution requires.’54 Both judgments’ statutory
interpretations, in short, ultimately drew on constitutional
understandings, and reflected different appraisals of the
constitution’s methods, or priorities, in the achievement of social
justice. 
If differences over constitutional values inform even decisions
about the interpretation of labour exemptions and agricultural
statutes, it is not surprising that such differences infuse decisions that
are more directly about the demands of the constitution. Thus the
debate over national security-based secrecy in Independent
Newspapers (Pty) Ltd v Minister for Intelligence Services clearly
reflected different stances about the constitutional concerns at
stake. For the majority, the correct approach was that
a court should be alive to the fact that it is confronted by competing
constitutional claims. The one claim is for open justice and the other
relates to the government’s obligation to pursue national security.55
On the other hand, Justice Sachs in dissent called for ‘special
attention ... to the importance of openness, a theme that until now
has not been given much attention in our jurisprudence.’56 
The government’s power to search the property and possessions
of its people as part of a criminal investigation equally clearly involves
profound constitutional values, and the judgments in Thint (Pty) Ltd
v National Director of Public Prosecutions, dealing with the propriety
of a search of Jacob Zuma’s lawyer’s office, reflect decidedly
different appreciations of those principles. The justices of the
majority reject the proposition that searches under the National
51 Section 39(2).
52 Wary (n 48 above) paras 84-85. 
53 Wary (n 48 above) para 108 (Yacoob J, dissenting).
54 Wary (n 48 above) para 138 (Yacoob J, dissenting). 
55 2008 8 BCLR 771 (CC) para 56 (Moseneke DCJ).
56 Thint (n 24 above) para 153 (dissenting judgment of Sachs J).
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Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 must be prohibited ’if there are
other, less drastic means [such as the use of a summons] available to
the investigating authority which may succeed.’ Langa CJ argues that
this approach
would inevitably provide accused persons who are dishonest with an
opportunity to cover their tracks. This does not reflect an appropriate
balance between the constitutional imperative to prevent crime and the
duty to respect, promote, protect and fulfill the rights in the Bill of
Rights.57
He holds instead that the correct test is whether it is ‘reasonable in
the circumstances for the state to seek a search warrant and not to
employ other less invasive means.’58 For the majority, constitutional
protection must not be turned into an invitation to circumvent the
enforcement of the criminal law. As Langa CJ writes:
In my view, this approach takes into account not only the need to
protect constitutional rights, but also the practicalities and difficulties
of law enforcement in the context of combating serious and organised
crime. The test I propose makes the destruction or concealment of this
material [sought by the government] more difficult and is a justifiable
limitation of the right to privacy. I cannot accept that privacy must be
upheld even if that entails a real risk of the disappearance of evidence
in serious corruption cases.59
Ngcobo J, in dissent, appraises the values at stake very differently.
He endorses the least restrictive alternative test, agreeing with a
lower court judge that ‘it cannot be reasonable’ to conduct a search
under the statute ‘if there are other less drastic means available to
the investigating officer which may succeed.’60 Ngcobo J asserts that
57 Thint (n 24 above) paras 119, 125 (Langa CJ)
58 Thint (n 24 above) para 126. This standard ‘‘will require a judicial officer to
consider whether there is an appreciable risk, to be judged objectively, that the
state will not be able to obtain the evidence by following a less invasive route.’’
Thint (n 24 above). 
59 Thint (n 24 above) para 128. 
Thint (n 24 above) para 294 (dissenting judgment of Ngcobo J). He goes on to
emphasise the words ‘which may succeed,’ and appears to say that if a less
drastic means ‘would probably not result in the evidence being obtained,’ then a
search would be appropriate. Thus the difference between the majority and
dissent may be measured as the difference between there being an ‘appreciable
risk’ of not obtaining the evidence by less drastic means, see n X above, and that
outcome being ‘probable.’ Earlier in his judgment, however, Ngcobo J wrote that
‘if following the … summons procedure would involve the risk of frustrating the
investigation, resorting to the search and seizure would be reasonable.’ Thint (n
24 above) para 280 (emphasis added). This formulation seems less demanding
than the test he states in Thint (n 24 above) para 292, and so the exact extent of
the difference between the two judgments on this score is not perfectly clear. 
But there may also be a deeper distinction. Ngcobo J says that ‘[t]here
should therefore be evidence under oath’ to demonstrate that less drastic
means will probably fail, though he does not require that there be
60
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‘to proceed on the premise that suspects, in particular those who are
accused of crimes involving dishonesty, cannot be trusted to co-
operate in response to a … summons’ is
inconsistent with our constitutional values of human dignity, the
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and
freedoms for all. They are indeed inconsistent with the right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.61
He responds to the clash of crime prevention and constitutional
protection in very different terms from Langa CJ:
The need to fight organised crime and, in particular corruption, cannot
be gainsaid. That fight, however, should not be fought at the expense of
the unwarranted limitation of constitutional rights. A nation that
considers itself under siege can be a danger unto itself. Constitutional
rights are invariably the first casualty in a nation which considers itself
to be under siege, whether the siege comes from the prevalence of
crime or some other source. It is precisely at such times that courts
ought to be vigilant and act as a bulwark against unwarranted invasion of
constitutional rights.62
It is not to be wondered at that South Africans differ in their
understanding of their own constitutional values. These values were
always capacious, and it is hard to imagine articulating fundamental
constitutional values that would not be capacious. Indeed, part of the
point of constitutional principles is probably to invite reflection, over
the years and generations, about the implications and meaning of the
principles articulated at the founding. That reflection began as soon
as the constitution was in place (really, it began long before that),
and has undoubtedly continued. By now, South Africans have been
thinking about their constitutional values for 15 years, and that is
60 evidence of ‘specific concerns about the likelihood of concealment or
destruction in a particular case.’ Thint (n 24 above) para 371. In contrast,
the majority maintains that ‘to ask the state to establish that a summons
[an available less drastic means under the statute] … would not result in
the production of the incriminating items would effectively require the
state to prove something that could hardly ever be proved.’ Thint (n 56
above) para 125 (majority judgment of Langa CJ). Instead, the majority
emphasises that the judicial officer determining whether there is an
‘appreciable risk’ that less drastic means would not be successful may
take into account broad considerations, such as that ‘it is generally not
improbably, given that serious crime which bears heavy penalties is under
investigation, that those implicated in the crime might well not produce
incriminating evidence when requested to do so.’ Thint (n 56 above) para
127. Ngcobo J grants that such ‘general concerns … are of some general
relevance,’ Thint (n 56 above) para 371 (dissenting judgment of Ngcobo
J), but he goes on to cast sharp constitutional doubt on their weight. The
net result is that the majority’s test seems meant to be deferential in
application, the dissent’s to be more sceptical. 
61 Thint (n 56 above) para 374 (dissenting judgment of Ngcobo J).
62 Thint (n 24 above) para 369.
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more than enough time for people to conclude that their own values,
long-held, call for different conclusions than they would once have
argued for. In the United States, for example, the commitment to
equal protection of the laws, by no means completely affirmed even
as to race in 1954, within decades took quite firm hold as to race,
came to be applied to gender, and now is increasingly, though
painfully incompletely, applied to sexual orientation as well. South
Africa’s founding values are still its values, but South Africans’
understanding of them surely has been evolving over these years of
rapid constitutional development.
Is there anything more that can be said, then, about what values
constitutional judges should hold? Certainly one can say, ‘judges
should believe in such-and-such a vision of transformation.’ And
perhaps they should. One can even make arguments for such a vision
that draw on the Constitution, and thus might be characterised as
legal arguments. But if law can be employed to argue for such
choices, I do not think we can deny that we are simultaneously in the
realm of politics. On grounds of politics you prefer one understanding
of the constitution’s values, someone else prefers another. 
If the choice of judges depends in part on their commitment to the
best conception of the constitution’s values, who is to say what the
best conception is? That’s not an easy question to answer, and it isn’t
my object to answer it. What is fair to say is that the system of
appointment of judges in South Africa seeks, in the Judicial Services
Commission, to mix together considerations of professional expertise
and political choice. Political actors make up much of the JSC’s
membership, but not all; and the President’s discretion is at its
greatest in the appointments to the Constitutional Court.63 Whether
that system opens the appointment process to too much political
influence, or whether it is not open enough to the political
preferences of the country whose judges are being chosen, are
questions I leave to you. What is important for my purposes is that I
do not think the law itself supplies some criterion by which we can
avoid recognising that many different views of the meaning of the
South African constitution’s normative, objective value system are
legitimate. If, in the end, the meaning of the Constitution is the
meaning the people of the country assign to it — as I suggested earlier
in explaining why Brown v Board of Education is binding law in the
United States — then the struggle over those meanings is a permanent
part of constitutionalism.
63 Sections 174 and 178. 
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Third, will the presence in decision-making of emotion, linked to 
values, jeopardise impartial judgment? 
If it is essential to constitutional judging to be emotionally attached
to the values of the constitution, how can judges render decisions
without fear or favour — without being influenced improperly by the
emotions that they necessarily and rightly feel? If judges were
rendering decisions based solely on technical skill, then mastery of
the skill would insure fair judgment, but we have seen that that is not
how constitutional judges (or, really, any judges) decide. If they were
rendering decisions based on a precisely defined and constraining
system of values, then too we might be able to count on fair
judgment, but once again we have seen that this recourse is not
available, because the legitimate range of values judges may hold is
too broad.64 What we must ask is whether judges, holding emotionally
charged commitments to a variety of conceptions of South Africa’s
values, can render impartial decisions.
Let us start with this: the judges I have described are not, and
should not be, impartial about the founding values of the South
African constitutional order (or the US constitutional system). One
can scarcely imagine what ‘impartiality’ about these founding values
could be or what sort of person could hold such a position — one in
which, say, he is neither for nor against free speech. On the contrary,
judges should be profoundly, emotionally committed to those values.
Njongi v. Member of the Executive Council, Department of
Welfare, Eastern Cape65 exemplifies this kind of commitment.
Yacoob J, for the Court, describes the treatment of pensioners by the
Eastern Cape government as a ‘disaster’66 and ‘unthinkably cruel and
utterly at odds with the constitutional vision to the achievement of
which that Government ought to have been committed.’67 When he
comes to the question of the Eastern Cape’s decision to contest its
liability for full repayment in court, he is even more emphatic, asking,
for example, ‘What about the wasteful expenditure incurred by
attempting to defend the morally indefensible?’ and characterising
another argument as ‘a cynical position devoid of all humanity.’68
What Yacoob J expresses on behalf of the Court is not simply anger,
64 In truth, once we recognise, as this section argues, that attachment to values can
distort judgment, we must acknowledge that even if all South African judges did
hold identical values, their commitments might undercut their ability to judge
fairly. A striking finding from studies of deliberation in groups is that like-minded
sets of people who reason together grow more extreme in their views. See D
Schkade et al ‘What happened on deliberation day?’ (2007) 95 California Law
Review 915, 917 (2007). 
65 2008 6 BCLR 571 (CC).
66 Njongi (n 66 above) para 9. 
67 Njongi (n 66 above) para 17. 
68 Njongi (n 66 above) para 90. 
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but what might be called constitutional anger, stemming directly
from a deep commitment to constitutional values. What is remarkable
about the case is not that the justices feel this deep commitment, or
that it plays a role in their decision. Rather, what is most striking is
that the judgment expresses so plainly not only the thinking but also
the feeling that went into it (perhaps because the egregious behavior
of the Eastern Cape government triggered especially strong feelings
among the justices).
But could a profound, emotional commitment to the values of the
South African constitutional order ever lead to an unfair decision?
Surely we know that the answer to this question must be yes. We know
this on the basis of our everyday understanding of human nature.
People become committed to particular ideas, and it becomes
impossible to persuade them to depart from those commitments. Our
predispositions shape what we perceive, and how we recall and assess
what we have already perceived.69 Equally commonly, people
become overwhelmed by emotions — hate, love, fear, all of the
normal range — and as a result they make judgments that are
unreasonable, unwise, unfair. This is just human nature.
Again, if judging could really be carried out by skill alone, then we
could respond to this reality of human nature by asking judges to free
themselves of the influence of emotion. It is not easy to understand
how people can really free themselves of the influence of emotion
altogether, but once we agree that emotion is integral to judging, this
‘solution’ becomes not only implausible but simply incoherent. One
might as well do logic without reasoning as do judging without feeling.
Years ago I wrote about the role of the ‘emergency team’ of
Appellate Division justices in the decision of cases dealing with the
regulations and actions of the state under its emergency powers in the
1980s.70 I criticised the selection of the panels of judges who heard
these cases, because, so I found, a majority of every panel came from
69 J Dowie & A Elstein ‘Introduction’ in J Dowie & A Elstein (eds) Professional
judgment: A reader in clinical decision making (1988) 1, 20: ‘The most common
error in processing data is to interpret data which should be non-contributory to a
particular hypothesis, and which even suggest that an alternative be considered,
as consistent with hypotheses already under consideration. The data best
remembered tend to be those that fit the hypotheses generated. Where findings
are distorted in recall, it is generally in the direction of making the facts more
consistent with typical clinical pictures. Positive findings tend to be
overemphasised and negative findings discounted and there is a tendency to seek
information that would confirm a hypothesis rather than the information that
would permit testing of two or more competing hypotheses.’ Cf. A Tversky & D
Kahneman, ‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases’ (1974) 185
Science 1124, reprinted in Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases in
D Kahneman et al (eds) (1982) 3-20 (On ‘judgmental heuristics’ people use, and
the risks of error these heuristics generate.)
70 S Ellmann In a time of trouble: Law and liberty in South Africa’s state of
emergency (1992).
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a small group of judges who never disagreed with each other’s results
— and whose results predominantly favoured the state.71 But those
judges no doubt sought to decide each case according to their lights,
which is to say, as we can now recognise, in light of the values to
which they were emotionally committed. The results were sad.72 
Yet the same processes are at work in judges of a just social order
as well. So, concretely, consider the judge who believes, for instance,
that Parliament is rightly vested with extensive policymaking
discretion in the harmonisation of customary law rules with changing
social conditions (subject of course to the constitution).73 She will
naturally tend to affirm the lawfulness of exercises of this discretion
by the government. Without being indifferent to the situation of the
individual men and women who challenge legislation as depriving
them of rights protected by customary law — or by the constitution —
she will tend to favour the legislature’s decisions. In that sense, she
will tend to ‘favour’ the government. A judge passionately committed
to eliminating the discriminatory features of all law, by contrast, will
tend to ‘favour’ those who are the victims of such discrimination. The
emotional commitments that are a central part of constitutional
judging seem inevitably to push judges towards partiality towards
some litigants as against others. And if these emotional commitments
are linked to factors such as race or gender, then we can expect that
judges of different demographics will tend — not by orders of
magnitude, of course, but by matters of degree — to judge
differently.74 Indeed, the fact that this is so is surely a major part of
the reason for the Constitution’s emphasis on the ‘need for the
judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of
South Africa.’75 
71 Ellmann (n 71 above) 56-71.
72 See also E Cameron ‘When judges fail justice’ (2004) 121 South African Law
Journal 580, 593-94. Samuel Pillsbury cites the egregious decision in Dred Scott,
Dred Scott v Sandford 60 US (19 How) 393 (1857), as an illustration of the
proposition that ‘[a] passion for justice can inspire extraordinarily bad decisions
that more dispassionate judges would avoid.’ Pillsbury (n 28 above) 350 & 361 n
41. In analysing one of the decisions of the state of emergency, Van der
Westhuizen NO v United Democratic Front 1989 2 SA 242 (A), I concluded that
Rabie ACJ’s judgment on a crucial point ‘simply does not contain an argument.
The only explanation he musters is the pained statement that to encompass
vagueness within ultra vires is ‘to my mind artificial and impure’. This is a cri de
cœur and no more.’ Ellmann (n 71 above) 105. Surely the failure of argument is a
mark of the presence and impact of emotion. But I also felt that there were some
signs that the Rabie Court’s infection by passion, ‘severe as it may have been,
was not so virulent as the disease that assailed the United States Supreme Court
when it decided the Dred Scott case.’ Ellmann (n 71 above) 203.
73 Section 211. 
74 Judge Posner writes that ‘[r]ace, religion, and gender have also been found ... to
be significant predictors of judges’ votes in cases that raise issues relating to
those characteristics.’ Posner How judges think (n 37 above) 96 & n 6 (citing
studies).
75 Section 174(2).
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Now one might respond, simply, that this isn’t the kind of
partiality that we expect judges to be free of. As a general
proposition, indeed, we do not consider firm views about the law —
views that are by definition unlikely, perhaps extremely unlikely, to
change — to be disqualifying. But this response isn’t quite
satisfactory. A judge who always ruled in favour of litigants who
claimed to be the victims of discrimination, because she was so
passionately committed to uprooting unconstitutional discrimination
that she could not bring herself to believe that a person claiming
discrimination might be mistaken or deceitful, would obviously not be
someone we would call impartial. A judge who rejected all arguments
contrary to his predispositions, sometimes on grounds that seemed
notably unpersuasive, might still count as impartial, but he would also
be well on the road to being closed-minded, and if that trait is not
disqualifying it is certainly not desirable either. All of these dangers,
moreover, are likely at their greatest in close cases; if the cases are
clear, after all, no distortion of judgment is likely.76 Commitment to
a value can lead to such distortions of judgment: the question I want
to ask is, given how integral emotion is to judging, how can judges
avoid falling into this peril?
Fourth, can empathy, or practical wisdom, or independence – 
insure fair judging?
Empathy: If emotional commitments to constitutional values pose a
threat to impartiality, we might hope to ‘fight fire with fire’ — to call
on judges to resist the power of their emotion-laden constitutional
commitments with another emotion that would encourage them to
feel a connection to every litigant. This is the promise of empathy,
which I’ll define very roughly as the capacity to understand the
situation and the feelings of others. (There are complex questions
about whether empathy involves just intellectual understanding or
also emotional connection; and about the differences, if any,
between empathy and related emotions such as identification or
sympathy; but none of those are central to our inquiry now.)77
Empathy was briefly in vogue — and as quickly fell into disfavour — in
American constitutional politics, as President Obama embraced it as
a critical virtue of constitutional judging. Figures as diverse as Justice
Sotomayor, whose capacity for empathy President Obama praised,
and Justices Alito and Thomas — two of the more conservative
members of our Supreme Court — have all pointed to their own
76 Posner ‘Emotionalism’ (n 28 above ) 321. 
77 See S Ellman et al Lawyers and clients: Critical issues in interviewing and
counseling (2009) 31, 69 n 22.
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backgrounds as helping them to keep in mind the real impact of the
decisions that they will make as judges on the lives of actual people.78
It does, indeed, make sense that a judge who can empathise with
a litigant will be more likely to take seriously the litigant’s testimony
about the facts, and her counsel’s argument about the law, than will
a judge who is unable to make an empathetic connection with that
litigant. So we might say that a judge who, while holding deep
constitutional commitments, is also able to empathise with every
person who comes before her is an impartial judge.
The Constitutional Court has, in fact, embraced the value of
empathy or sympathy. In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Others v
City of Johannesburg and Others,79 one of a series of cases in which
the Constitutional Court has tried to give meaning to the right of
access to housing,80 Yacoob J builds on the Court’s developing
endorsement of the distinctly empathetic idea of ‘engagement’
between government and those facing or enduring homelessness. He
writes:
Engagement has the potential to contribute towards the resolution of
disputes and to increased understanding and sympathetic care if both
sides are willing to participate in the process ... It is precisely to ensure
that a city is able to engage meaningfully with poor, vulnerable or
illiterate people that the engagement process should preferably be
managed by careful and sensitive people on its side.81
The idea of engagement — both its limits and its reach — also echoes
in Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the Republic of South
Africa.82 There the Court had to decide whether the Gauteng
provincial legislature’s interaction with the people of Merafong was
or was not in compliance with the legislature’s constitutional duty to
receive public input on the proposed transfer of Merafong from
Gauteng to North West Province. To do so, the justices debated the
significance of the legislators’ failure to ‘report back’ to the Merafong
community. For the majority, as Van der Westhuizen J concluded, this
failure was reasonable, though ‘possibly disrespectful.’83 For Sachs J
78 See SA Bandes, Empathetic judging and the rule of law, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1431230, 2-3.
79 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2008 5
BCLR 475 (CC).
80 Section 26.
81 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road (n 80 above) para 15 (emphasis added).
82 Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of South
Africa and Others 2008 10 BCLR 969 (CC). For a reading of this case as an
articulation of the ‘listening constitution,’ see Michael Bishop ‘Vampire or prince?
The listening constitution and Merafong Demarcation Forum & Others v President
of the Republic of South Africa & Others’ (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review –
(Forthcoming)
83 Merafong Demarcation Forum (n 83 above) paras 55-56.
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in dissent, this failure amounted to ‘an interrupted dialogue, when
expectations of candour and open-dealing have been established and
certain unambiguous commitments have been made,’ and so could be
‘more disruptive of a relationship than silence from the start might
have been.’84 
In urging empathetic relationships between others, the Court is
bearing witness to the value of this quality for its own decision-making
as well. Justice Sachs has written about essentially this same quality
from off the bench. Discussing the danger of ‘too much subjectivity’
in judging, and the need for controls against it, he observes:
A crucial element of control is created by calling upon the judge to have
what Jennifer Nedelsky calls an ‘enlarged mentality’, that is an active
vision that enables him or her to rise above individual idiosyncracy to
cover the standpoint of others belonging to the community to be
persuaded.85
I agree with this call, and with the aspiration to meet it. But while it
is admirable to empathise with everyone, few of us find everyone
equally easy to empathise with. In fact, it appears to be the case that
most of us empathise more easily with those who are like us.
Moreover, some people may really be a lot harder to empathise with
than others. That means that if empathy is essential, all we can really
demand is some basic quantum of empathy; we cannot expect equal
empathy for every person. As Susan Bandes has observed, ‘[s]elective
empathy is inevitable.’86 
Just as the Constitutional Court has affirmed the value of
empathy, it has on occasion made clear that it does not feel equal
sympathy for all who come before it. In the 2008 term, the Court
vividly conveyed this message in Njongi. In Njongi, the question arose
of whether a de bonis propriis costs order should be made in light of
the Eastern Cape’s seemingly abusive use of litigation to stave off its
rightful liabilities to the citizens whose grants it had cut off. Justice
Yacoob wrote for the Court: 
I must at the outset make it plain that I have reluctantly come to the
conclusion that it would not be just to make a de bonis propriis order for
costs against anyone in the circumstances of this case. I do not therefore
intend to traverse those averments and contentions aimed at avoiding
that result. It must however not be understood that there is any
agreement with or sympathy for these averments or contentions.87
84 Merafong Demarcation Forum (n 83 above) para 291 (dissenting judgment of
Sachs J) (emphasis added).
85 A Sachs The strange alchemy of life and law (2009) 143.
86 Bandes (n 79 above) 14.
87 Njongi (n 66 above) para 63 (Yacoob J, emphasis added). 
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Justice Sachs joined this judgment and in his book, though he
eloquently urges ‘civilised conversation rather than rude discourse
between the three branches’ of government, he also recognises that
‘[t]here might be times when the judiciary feels that the particular
way in which the Constitution has been violated calls for
appropriately pointed language.’88
Perhaps there is a trace of a similar decision that one side, but not
the other, rightly merits sympathy in Equity Aviation Services (Pty)
Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration,89
which dealt with how long a period of back pay could be awarded as
part of an order to reinstate an employee. In the course of resolving
the case in the employee’s favour, Nkabinde J observes that
it is a matter of great concern that the system of expedited adjudication
of unfair dismissal disputes which the LRA sought to establish often
operates far from expeditiously. The case at hand [in which the
Commission issued its decision in 2002] is a good example of how labour
disputes are taking far too long to reach finality.90
While Nkabinde J observed in the next sentence that such delays
burden both employers and workers, she later invokes this same
concern in rejecting the employer’s effort to obtain a remittal to
allow it to raise further arguments against the full award. Here she
observes that to permit remittal ‘will afford Equity a second bite at
the cherry. That will be unfair to Mr. Mawelele [the employee] and,
needless to say, this Court cannot sanction that result.’91 The
emphatic tone of this comment may reflect an emotional as well as
legal response to Equity’s litigation maneuvers.
Should the incompleteness of empathy trouble us? We should
expect that the inequality of the empathetic connections judges (and
everyone else) make will tend to guide results as well. In general, that
observation is not a reason to perceive injustice in what the judges
decide, just as the fact that judges are emotionally attached to
constitutional values is not, in general, a reason to believe their
decisions are unjust. It is possible, in fact, that judges will make their
strongest empathetic connections precisely with those people whose
cases most embody the values of the Constitution. If so, then these
two forms of emotional response may coincide. But just as with
constitutional passion, so with empathy: we must acknowledge the
88 Sachs (n 86 above) 147.
89 2009 2 BCLR 111 (CC).
90 Equity (n 90 above) para 52. 
91 Equity (n 90 above) para 56.
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possibility that the connection, like the conviction, will be too
strong.92 
In that case, we certainly should not rely simply on the judge’s
instinctive tendency to empathise as a check on this risk, precisely
because that instinctive tendency will likely be uneven and
inequitable. We might say that a judge should decline to hear a case
in which she feels absolutely no empathetic connection to one side –
in which, for instance, she cannot feel even a glimmer of
understanding of the fear or rage that motivated an accused person’s
participation in a crime. But these cases will likely be few and far
between, and ‘even a glimmer of understanding’ may not be very
much. 
Instead, if we want judges to employ empathy as a way to
maintain the kind of openness that we can accept as the mark of
impartiality, we need them to learn to do so.93 Like many
interpersonal attributes, a disposition to empathy is no doubt hard to
create out of nothing, but there are probably few people with no
disposition to empathy at all, and for those who have this capacity,
exercising it, practicing it, likely can make it more natural and
automatic. 
And yet judges must not learn empathy too well. For if we assume
a judge who empathises profoundly with all those who come before
him, we may have also described a judge who cannot render
decisions. Judicial decisions are meant to take account of the lawful
interests of all who come before the court, but they are also meant
to resolve conflicts in favour of one side and against another. The
party, the people, decided against will be harmed; the empathetic
92 As Toni Massaro has written, ‘[m]isplaced empathy, like misplaced disgust, can
produce normatively poor decisions – as in the tendency of some judges or juries
to excuse offenders whose negative emotional response to homosexuality
prompts them to engage in violent acts against gays and lesbians. Again, no
emotion is normatively transfixed.’ TM Massaro ‘Show (some) emotions’ in SA
Bandes (ed) The passions of law (1999) 80, 120 n 33.
93 Even this is likely not enough. Bandes comments that ‘We all use empathy, and
despite our best intentions, it is always selective and riddled with blind spots. We
can try to correct for this partiality if we are self-aware. But those who study
cognitive psychology and decision-making find that we aren’t all that good at
identifying and critiquing our own background assumptions. A better way to
encourage this sort of correction is through debate with others who hold differing
viewpoints.’ Bandes (n 93 above) 16 (footnote omitted). This essay focuses on
each judge – but Bandes’ observation reflects that the justice of a Court’s
decisions deeply reflects the contributions, legal and emotional, of all its
members.
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judge will feel that harm; the judge who feels it too fully may be
unable to inflict it.94
In Thint, for example, the validity of the searches turned on
whether there was an ‘appreciable risk’ that other less drastic
methods would have sufficed. To answer that question entailed
deciding whether the targets of the search, including the Thint
company and Jacob Zuma, would have cooperated. The Constitutional
Court determined that ‘[t]here is … reason to believe that the full,
voluntary co-operation of Mr Zuma may not have been forthcoming,’
and that
[t]here must at the very least be a real risk that a person who is
suspected to have been involved in corruption and who is, on reasonable
grounds, believed to have provided false information in response to
questions by the state, would not preserve the integrity of incriminating
documents if he knew that the documents were being sought.95
These words are measured, but they necessarily inflicted harm.
Legal decisions may also harm people who are not even suspected
of fault. The justices of the Constitutional Court undoubtedly
empathised with Mr Soobramoney. As Chaskalson CJ wrote,
One cannot but have sympathy for the appellant and his family, who face
the cruel dilemma of having to impoverish themselves in order to secure
the treatment that the appellant seeks in order to prolong his life.96
But if the justices had empathised too intensely, they could not have
decided against his claim. Health care resources, however, were not
‘co-extensive with compassion,’ and so the Court decided, with
compassion, to deny his claim.97 Here, vividly, we see the importance
of another judicial virtue, the quality of detachment.
94 Judge Posner says that ‘most judges are (surprisingly to nonjudges) unmoved by
the equities of the individual case,’ and quotes Hamlet: ‘The hand of little
employment hath the daintier sense.’ Posner How judges think (n 37 above ) 119,
quoting William Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 5, sc. 1, l. 66. Posner continues: ‘Just
as doctors tend to be callous about sick people, judges tend to be callous about
pathetic litigants because they have seen so many of them.’ Posner How judges
think (n 37 above ) 119. I would hope that ‘callous’ is an overstatement.
95 Thint (n 56 above) para 133 (majority judgment of Langa CJ).
96 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 12 BCLR 1696 (CC) para
31.
97 I borrow here from Justice Sachs’ concurring judgment, in which he praises the
understanding that Mr Soobramoney himself showed of the conflicting claims in
his case, and concludes, ‘If resources were co-extensive with compassion, I have
no doubt as to what my decision would have been. Unfortunately, the resources
are limited, and I can find no reason to interfere with the allocation undertaken
by those better equipped than I to deal with the agonising choices that had to be
made.’ Soobramoney (n 97 above ) para 59.
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Practical wisdom: Could we say that the central quality judges
need is a combination of sympathy and detachment, together forming
the distinctive practical wisdom that should (along with public-
spiritedness) mark the work of judges?98 Anthony Kronman has
eloquently argued for this view, in his book The Lost Lawyer: Failing
Ideals of the Legal Profession.99 Here he develops an account of ‘the
values embodied in the figure of the lawyer-statesman,’ values which
he sees as also quintessentially judicial.100 The lawyer-statesman’s
skill, and virtue (for Kronman sees this as a character trait rather than
simply an expertise), is deliberation, and ‘[j]udging is a paradigm of
deliberation.’101 
Deliberation, in turn, requires both compassion and detachment.
Compassion, or sympathy (both terms whose meaning seems quite
comparable to that of empathy) is a form of ‘feeling with,’102 which
‘goes beyond mere observation, … [but] also falls short of outright
acceptance.’103 Kronman explains, in the context of describing
deliberation about one’s own life choices, that
when an individual is deliberating about an important personal choice, it
is essential that he preserve some distance between his present point of
view and those of the alternatives before him ... The attitude of
sympathy for which the process of personal deliberation calls might
therefore be described as one of suspended identification, less
disinterested than the attitude of the observer but more detached than
love.104 
I don’t question the importance of the two virtues of sympathy and
detachment — and Kronman fully recognises how difficult it can be to
achieve both of these virtues at once.105 But how should these virtues
coalesce? Kronman’s answer is reflected in his account of the impact
of the case method in law school instruction, a method he sees as
giving ‘priority’ to ‘the judicial point of view.’106 He writes: 
98 Judge Posner offers a much more prosaic account of ‘good judgment,’ which he
treats as a ‘cousin of intuition and another major factor in judicial decisions’ not
bounded by ‘techniques of exact inquiry.’ He characterises ‘good judgment’ as
‘an elusive faculty best understood as a compound of empathy, modesty,
maturity, a sense of proportion, balance, a recognition of human limitations,
sanity, prudence, a sense of reality, and common sense.’ Posner How judges think
(n 37 above) 117. It would be hard to deny the value of any of these components
of judgment (nor would I quarrel with their ‘pragmatic’ bent), but in this essay I
focus on trying to make certain aspects of this quality less ‘elusive.’
99 Kronman (n 25 above). For a thoughtful discussion and development of Kronman’s
views, see B Scharffs ‘The role of humility in exercising practical wisdom’ (1998)
32 University of California Davis Law Review 127, 142-44.
100 Kronman (n 25 above) 317.
101 Kronman (n 25 above) 319.
102 Kronman (n 25 above) 70.
103 Kronman (n 25 above) 71.
104 Kronman (n 25 above) 71-72.
105 Kronman (n 25 above) 72.
106 Kronman (n 25 above) 117.
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[W]hat the case method really robs [students] of is their faith in large
ideas, and what it puts in place of this faith is a form of skepticism — the
tendency to look with suspicion on broad generalisations, to search for
the qualifying exception to every abstraction, to insist on the
importance of details. Students who become skeptics in this sense are
likely, in time, to find complexity more congenial than simplicity, and
though their skepticism may at first extend only to the usefulness of
abstractions in the law, there will be a natural tendency for their doubts
to grow into a generalised pragmatism that views with suspicion any
political program inspired by their old faith in the power of ideas.107 
The result will be
a broad familiarity with diverse and irreconcilable human goods coupled
with an indefatigable willingness to enter the fray, hear the arguments,
render judgment, and articulate the reasons that support it, even when
all hope of moral certainty is gone. At war with itself, this complex set
of attitudes nonetheless describes a recognisable moral ideal, an ideal
closest, perhaps, to the public-spirited stoicism implied by the Roman
term gravitas.108
Kronman is, I think, profoundly right to emphasise how tremendously
the views, and wishes, of members of a single society may differ from
each other, and how hard it can be to encompass such differences in
a humane community. But at the same time, Kronman’s description
of the lawyer-statesman seems incomplete. To me, it simply does not
grasp the essence of a political leader and lawyer such as Abraham
Lincoln or of a judge such as Earl Warren, the author of the Brown
decision. To be sure, Kronman is not saying that we should abandon
trying to distinguish rights from wrongs, or acting on the distinction.
He writes, for instance, that in ‘[r]ecognising the moral imperative for
change, the lawyer who embraces this ideal [of the lawyer-statesman]
will nevertheless prefer to move slowly and by small degrees.’109
Again, this characterisation seems to miss something crucial about
Lincoln, who waged a Civil War, and Warren, whose landmark
judgment in Brown v Board of Education hypothesises a nonexistent
state of material equality between segregated white and black
schools in order to say that, as a matter of sheer constitutional
principle, segregation is inherently unequal and unconstitutional.
In a way what is most startling, however, is what the lawyer-
statesman ideal, understood as intrinsically conservative, does not
honor. John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, revolutionaries, must stand
outside this ideal. So must Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo and
Bram Fischer. I think that Kronman would say that the virtues required
107 Kronman (n 25 above) 159.
108 Kronman (n 25 above) 117-18.
109 Kronman (n 25 above) 161.
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for revolutions are different from those required for a society that
does not seek its own death and rebirth.110 There's force to that, but
it overstates the difference between stability and change. Passionate
leadership against injustice is an integral part of everyday life in the
United States, and in a broad sense our stability consists in our
capacity to make the values of these passionate reformers part of the
ever-changing fabric of the country. A major part of what American
lawyers pride themselves on is their passionate commitment to
justice, even in opposition to entrenched and powerful authority. And
surely this struggle for justice is even more integral to the life of the
law in South Africa, a nation committed to transformation of its own
history of injustice. 
In short, it seems to me that Kronman's valuation of the
conservative lawyer-statesman misses part of what is admirable, and
admired about lawyers — their engagement in passionate calls for
justice and change. Perhaps few lawyers or people can fully meld
together the capacity for sympathetic detachment and the
determination to make a vision of justice real. But I would say that
the ideal of the lawyer-statesman is not the stoic harmoniser of
others' passions, but the person who both feels passion and
understands how to make his or her ideals real in a world where many
others, inevitably and profoundly, see the world differently. Doing
that takes sympathy and detachment, and I think Kronman is right to
identify these values and to focus on how to elicit them. But they are
not all that lawyers need.
Independence: Could the missing ingredient be independence? If
judges must achieve a difficult balance of sympathy and detachment
fueled by underlying passion for constitutional justice, could the
solution be for judges to jealously guard their independence so as to
avoid being pulled away from the balance they have struck?
Independence is an old answer to the problem of judging fairly, and
entitled to respect for that reason. It is not too much to say that one
of the finest legacies of the old legal order was its tradition of judicial
independence — even though the discrimination and oppression of the
old order undercut the strength of this legacy. The fact that
independence is a part of South African legal heritage, and that it has
come under threat again in the new South Africa, confirms its
importance. Moreover, it does make sense to think that one way a
judge might protect herself against losing her emotional balance is to
110 He writes that those who ‘celebrate … the liberating worldlessness of revolution
fail to see that politics is always the pursuit of order, and that its inherent
conservatism implies a continuing affirmation of the value of political fraternity,
in all but those transitional episodes of birth and death that mark the limits of
political life. In this sense it is right to say that my account of statesmanship, with
its emphasis on the value of political fraternity, entails a commitment to order
and the status quo.’ Kronman (n 25 above) 108.
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commit herself to the principle that she must chart her own course.
Yet independence is not a sufficient answer to the problem of the
power of emotion in judging. 
It is, first of all, not self-evident how independent judges should
be. Of course judges should not participate in telephone justice —
where the party official phones in the decision to the judge — and
should not be subjected to bribes or threats. But should judges view
the government’s policies with suspicion or welcome? The answer may
depend on the field of policy — restrictions on free speech might get
one response, efforts to provide counsel to unrepresented people
accused of crimes quite another. 
To take an example from the 2008 Term, in President of the
Republic of South Africa and Others v Quagliani, and Two Similar
Cases, the Constitutional Court considered challenges to the validity
of South Africa’s extradition agreement with the United States.111
The relevant statute gave the President power to enter into such
agreements, but the President had delegated the power to sign the
agreements to the Minister of Justice. Sachs J read the statute against
the background of the Constitution’s vesting the national executive
with responsibility for making treaties, and concluded that ‘[i]t is
important that these provisions should not be applied in a formalistic
manner that will impair the ability of the national executive to
function.’112 This conclusion might be characterised as deferential,
and perhaps one could quarrel with it; but its roots in an appraisal of
the relevant constitutional considerations seem plain. 
Similarly, Walele v City of Cape Town and Others may be seen as
involving a question of the proper degree of deference to be paid to
the administrative necessities of the building approval process at
issue in that case.113 O’Regan ADCJ, in dissent, maintained that
[r]equiring that not only plans and approval documents, but also a report
from the Building Control Officer setting out the factors favourable and
adverse to the approval of the plans, be placed before the ultimate
decision-maker would impose a heavy burden on municipalities. It is not
an interpretation of the legislation which one would adopt unless one
were persuaded that written reports would serve an important
function …114
Jafta AJ, however, wrote for the Court that despite the ‘salutary
procedure’ which Cape Town had adopted, ‘no matter how impressive
111 2009 2 SA 466 (CC).
112 Quagliani (n 112 above) para 25.
113 2008 11 BCLR 1067 (CC).
114 Walele (n 114 above) para 70 (dissenting judgment of O’Regan ADCJ).
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the process might be, it is no substitute for the mandatory
requirements of the Building Standards Act.’115 
The answer may also depend on the particular reading of the
constitution’s values to which the judge is committed (including the
judge’s view of the role of the people in determining the meaning of
their constitution). Justice Holmes eloquently advocated for the
people’s right to govern themselves, and that stance might call for
vigilance in protecting democratic liberties but deference to the
policy choices democracy produces.116 Members of the American legal
process school, who can be seen as inheritors of Holmes’ wish that
judges take account of social realities, might well have said that
fundamentally judges and other government officials are engaged in
the same enterprise of good governance, and should be disposed to
see each other as engaged in a cooperative enterprise, and I think
myself that in a just society there is force to this view.117 Certainly
courts cannot help but recall that they have no armies, and rely
ultimately on the consent of the governed (and of the other
governors) to carry their judgments into effect. 
But more fundamentally, independence is not an escape from
emotion. A judge committed to independence will no doubt be
committed to other values as well; independence does not shield her
from the effects of her own emotions, and perhaps actually makes her
more susceptible to them, since she is so indifferent to persuasion by
others.118 Independence itself is a value, to which a judge may be
emotionally committed — and that emotion may have its own impact
on the judge’s decision-making. It is quite possible to imagine judges
who fall so much into an emotional attachment to independence as a
value that they imagine themselves above the society of which they
are in fact a part. An emotional attachment to skill in legal reasoning,
it might be added, could have similar pitfalls.
115 Walele (n 114 above) para 70 (majority judgment of Jafta AJ).
116 Lochner v New York 198 US 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J, dissenting). John Hart Ely
built his conception of ‘representation-reinforcing’ constitutional review around
this fundamental theme. See JH Ely, Democracy and distrust: A theory of judicial
review (1980).
117 In an unjust society, such as apartheid South Africa, there was much to be gained
by resisting the notion that courts should take such a cooperative stance towards
Parliament. See Ellmann (n 71 above) at 49-50.
118 As one observer has said, ‘judicial independence may liberate judges to act on
their individual biases without fear of reprisal, to the detriment of impartiality.’
C Gardner Geyh, Straddling the fence between truth and pretence: The Role of
law and preference in judicial decision-making and the future of judicial
independence, Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1497004. 
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Fifth: The bottom line — so what is a judge to do? 
I think we can find guidance in answering this question in the words
of the Constitutional Court in Thint. Thint is, of course, a remarkable
case. It is remarkable enough for a court to have to rule on issues
affecting the potential criminal trial of someone in position to
become President of the country. But Thint moved from difficult to
nightmarish with the reported intervention of another judge in the
Constitutional Court’s decision-making. In the midst of the legal
fracas that ensued and has not yet ended, the justices of the
Constitutional Court had to finish deciding the questions raised by the
search at issue in Thint itself. In the words of the majority judgment
by Langa CJ: 
All the members of the Court ... have considered their position in the
light of the events mentioned above and their responsibilities as Judges
of this Court. We are satisfied that the alleged acts that form the basis
of the complaint to the JSC by Judges of this Court have had no effect or
influence on the consideration by the Court of the issues in these cases
and in the judgments given. It is recorded in the statement of complaint
that there is no suggestion that any of the parties in these cases have
had anything to do with the alleged conduct that forms the basis of the
complaint by the Judges of the Court. The issues relating to the
complaint have accordingly been kept strictly separate from the
adjudication process in these cases. It is however important to
emphasise that the cases have been considered and decided in the
normal way, in accordance with the dictates of our Oath of Office and in
terms of the Constitution and the law, without any fear, favour or
prejudice.119
I believe the justices were entirely correct in concluding that they
could still judge the case before them fairly. To say this, however, is
to say quite a lot about the role of emotion and values in judging. The
members of the Constitutional Court surely felt many strong emotions
as a result of the events that led them to file a complaint with the
Judicial Service Commission. Even without this extraordinary feature,
the case would have prompted emotion on its own, involving as it did
the fate of a potential President, and ultimately the well-being of the
country itself. It was, moreover, by no means the only case the Court
confronted in 2008 that carried such significance; five of the Court’s
23 judgments in 2008 arose from one aspect or another of the
country’s ongoing political crisis.120
119 Thint (n 56 above) para 6. 
The two Thint decisions dealt, respectively, with a search of the offices of Jacob
Zuma’s lawyer, Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2008 12
BCLR 1197 (CC) and with a request for evidence bearing on the Zuma case from a
foreign country, Thint Holdings (Southern Africa) (Pty) Ltd and Another v
National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 (3) BCLR 309 (CC). In Independent
120
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When the members of the Constitutional Court concluded that
they could fairly decide the search case, therefore, they were surely
not saying that they were unemotional — which would have been to
say that they were inhuman. What they were saying was that their
emotions were properly cabined.
What does it mean to ‘properly cabin’ — while still feeling — one's
emotions? I don’t think that we yet have a clear psychological account
of what it means to be an emotional, yet fair, decision-maker — but
this is what constitutional judges (and probably all other judges too)
must be, and so it is important to try to characterise what it is we seek
in judges now.
It makes sense to begin with the answers we have already
reached. It is important for judges to be committed to the values of
the constitution; if they do not have this basic commitment, they will
still be emotional decision-makers but their emotions will be turned
in some other direction. It is also important for judges to be
empathetic towards all the parties before them, while also
maintaining a measure of detachment; and for them to be insistent on
their own independence as decision-makers, again to a degree.
But the human reality is that judges’ emotions, like ours, are
complex and ambivalent. Did no tremor of anger, frustration or
sorrow cross any of the judges’ minds as they considered the Thint
case? Perhaps not — but the justices were unusual people if that was
so. More likely, like the rest of us, they felt at various moments
emotions that in sufficient force might easily have disrupted their
decision-making. No judge is free of troubling emotions, we can safely
assume — though it does matter which emotions dominate a judge’s
heart. The judge with a passion for fairness is much more likely to be
fair than the judge with a passion for revenge.121 Everything we know
120 Newspapers v. Minister for Intelligence Services, the Court had to decide whether
it would require the disclosure of secret information held by the government
bearing on the politically-charged dismissal of the head of Intelligence. Glenister
v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others was an attempt by Mr
Glenister, a private citizen, to block the proposed legislation to place the
‘Scorpions,’ a law enforcement unit with a reputation for political independence,
under the potentially less independent control of the South African Police
Service. [2008] ZACC 19. Finally, Shaik and Others v State 2008 8 BCLR 834 (CC)
dealt with the forfeiture of some of Mr. Shaik’s assets as a result of his conviction
for corruption. The person he was convicted of bribing, as is well known, was
Jacob Zuma. O’Regan ADCJ emphasised, for the Court, that Zuma’s state of mind
was not at issue in the case (para 47), but nonetheless found it necessary to say
that ‘it must be accepted for the purpose of these proceedings that Mr Shaik did
pay bribes to Mr Zuma’ (para 26).
121 Posner suggests that emotions that tend to make us feel more certain of our
conclusions also make us ‘disinclined to engage in systematic analysis, especially
of a taxing sort’ – obviously an impediment to carefully reasoned decision making.
Posner How judges think (n 37 above) 106. But he also considers ‘overconfidence
… an occupational risk of all judges.’ Posner How judges think (n 37 above) 120. 
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about psychology says that the troubling feelings a fair judge
nevertheless feels cannot be completely suppressed. Since
suppression is impossible, the judge who recognises his or her own
impulses and can accept them without horror is much more likely to
handle those feelings well than the judge who denies their existence
while they course through him or her. 
Yet the judge must not give free rein to those emotions. We come,
then, to objectivity. In TS Eliot’s words, we arrive at this familiar
place and ‘know it for the first time’.122 By ‘objective’ judgment I
don't mean judgment somehow from outside the bounds of one's
society and its many predispositions and assumptions; none of us can
get that far outside ourselves. We cannot even free ourselves of our
own predispositions and values; they are us. Yet we know that people
say, quite routinely, things like ‘I really don’t want to do such-and-
such, but I think it’s the right thing to do.’ Those statements reflect
that we are capable of sorting among our own thoughts and feelings,
and concluding that some are entitled to greater weight than others.
Objectivity in law, then, is the ability to guide one’s own thoughts
towards the issues posed by the law and by the facts of the particular
case at hand rather than those generated by other claims upon us.123
Objectivity is, in part, an individual capacity. Others have sought
to catalog the judicial virtues, perhaps above all the virtue of
‘practical wisdom’. I don’t seek to add to that account here, other
than to say that I agree that individual judicial character matters.124
My focus is not on individual traits, however, but on the social
structure within which they are nurtured — specifically, on an
institutional practice that helps sustain the individual capacity for
objectivity. That practice is something quite old: the discipline of the
law. It may be, in our intellectual world, that law’s foundation is
ultimately incomplete. But if its foundations are not entirely solid,
nevertheless the edifice of the law is immense. Law is like a planet;
its sheer size generates a massive internal gravity, and a guiding
122 TS Eliot ‘Little Gidding’ Four Quartets (1943) (poem first published in 1942).
123 Posner, somewhat similarly, says that ‘a person’s judgment is distorted by
‘emotionalism’’ if ‘that person has given undue salience to one feature of the
situation and its associated emotional stimulus, neglecting other important
features.’ Posner, Emotion versus emotionalism (n 38 above) 311.
124 On the judicial virtues, see P Horwitz, ‘Judicial character (and does it matter)’ —
Constitutional Commentary — (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1444970; LB Solum ‘The aretaic turn in constitutional theory’ (2004-05)
70 Brooklyn Law Review 475, 502-22. See also MN Aaronson ‘We ask you to
consider: Learning about practical judgment in lawyering (1998) 4 Clinical Law
Review 247. Here, as in most aspects of life, I doubt that there is one and only
one set of desirable qualities, which each judge ideally should have. As Samuel
Pillsbury writes, ‘Perhaps there is no perfect judge for all cases, no single
individual with the ideal blend of qualities to resolve all cases ... We are left with
a sobering reminder of the humanity of law and the importance of emotive
diversity in judicial ranks.’ Pillsbury (n 28 above) 351-52.
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discipline. I do not suggest that practicing this discipline confines
judges to any one set of results (or anything close to that);125 my
point, rather, is that it helps judges, shaped as they inevitably and
rightly are by their values and emotions, to be judicious as well.
We can see this discipline at work in Glenister v President of the
Republic of South Africa and Others, another politically charged case.
Glenister, as mentioned already, asked for judicial intervention to
block proposed legislation so as to preserve the independence of the
law enforcement unit known as the ‘Scorpions.’ The Constitutional
Court by no means always adopts the language of emotion. In his
judgment for the Court, Langa CJ comments that the arguments for
the need for judicial action to preserve the independence of the
Scorpions
were presented with a great deal of passion, no doubt because of the
important and emotive debates in the country about the unacceptable
levels of crime, its prevention and the measures that are being, or
should be, employed to combat it.126
Langa CJ’s response, however, seems to aim to put passion aside:
‘The reasons advanced, however, require close examination.’127 I
think that Langa CJ’s words here, and in his description of the
justices’ approach to Thint, reflect a characteristic tone of the
judgments of the Constitutional Court. I take that measured tone not
to indicate (or even to assert) the absence of emotion, but to reflect
the discipline, the self-discipline, of the law.
What does the discipline of the law entail? Its elements, certainly
not always honored in the past, are at the core of South Africa’s post-
apartheid culture. It has always called for transparency — public
arguments, to which judges are obliged to listen, and to which they
are expected to respond.128 Judicial process is uniquely designed to
foster focused and extensive argument. Judges, more than any other
actors in democratic states, work in a process that fosters
consideration of what is said and calls for their engagement with and
response to the arguments that are made before them. Politicians
125 Horwitz (n 125 above) at 43-48, carefully critiques arguments that what I am
calling the discipline of the law much constrains the decisions judges make.
126 Glenister (n 121 above) para 48.
127 Glenister (n 121 above) para 49. 
128 Response is required. But judges on a multi-judge court may have legitimate
reasons to join in decisions which do not precisely, and conceivably do not even
loosely, express their views. For one exploration of these issues, see S Ellmann
‘The rule of law and the achievement of unanimity in Brown’ (2004-05) 49 New
York Law School Law Review 741. Moreover, the response that is called for by the
discipline of law is legal reasoning. It may be appropriate, even profoundly
valuable, for a judge to give open expression to his or her emotions in a
judgment, but those are not the principal subject — important as those emotions
may have been to the shaping of the judge’s legal reasoning. 
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may hear less — in part because they need to speak more loudly. It is
not necessary to endorse each decision of the Constitutional Court in
2008 to say that overall these cases reflect the Court’s effort to
provide such disciplined, attentive response to legal claims — perhaps
nowhere more so than in the Thint judgments, whose detailed,
thoughtful arguments typify such discipline (whether or not one
agrees with all of the points either of the judgments urges). 
The discipline of law has also always called for justification —
judges’ views, and lawyers’ arguments, must offer reasoned
explanation for their decisions. The obligation to justify in turn puts
a value on deliberation, through which judges can encounter each
other’s differing perspectives.129 Justification also calls for a
connection to the body of other law — not always an incremental
connection (and incrementalism, I know, may not be the best
approach in the midst of transformation), but still a connection.
Politicians may respond more ideologically, more abruptly, more
pragmatically and imprecisely; judges make their decisions in a more
constrained structure.
In speaking of the discipline of the law, we might equally speak of
the ‘rule of law.’ 2008 was a year when the rule of law was no doubt
much on the mind of the Constitutional Court. The series of cases
from the country’s ongoing Presidential crisis raised, again and again,
the question of whether the country’s judicial and legal institutions
could function with integrity in the midst of brutal political strife. But
other cases raised rule of law issues as well: Njongi, in which the
Constitutional Court confronted the Eastern Cape’s abuse of the social
grant system; Nyathi v Member of Executive Council, in which the
Constitutional Court responded to the difficulties litigants faced in
enforcing judgments against the state by deciding that a ban on
execution on such judgments was unconstitutional;130 and Merafong
Demarcation Forum, in which the proceedings that a majority of the
justices upheld were subject to, in Justice Sachs’ words,
a strong perception … that the legislative process had been a sham
because an irreversible deal had already been struck at a political level
outside the confines of the legislative process in terms of which, come
what may, Merafong was going to go to North West.131
At the same time, 2008’s decisions reflect the breadth of the power
of the Constitutional Court. Its jurisdiction is limited to
129 See Horwitz (n 125 above) at 32. It is dispiriting to read that ‘the fact that
[judges] do not deliberate (by which I mean deliberate collectively) is the real
secret.’ Posner How judges think (n 37 above) 2, n5. The Constitutional Court’s
internal practice, happily, appears to be quite different. Sachs (n 86 above).
130 2008 9 BCLR 865 (CC).
131 Merafong (n 125 above) para 292 (judgment of Sachs J).
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‘constitutional matters, and issues connected with decisions on
constitutional matters.’ 132 However, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
made clear how very wide that resulting jurisdiction is. Its remedial
power is also vast, as (like lower courts, but with the final say) the
Constitutional Court ‘must’ declare laws invalid if they are
inconsistent with the Constitution, but are free to ‘make any order
that is just and equitable.’133 
These are broad powers indeed, and 2008 saw striking examples
of this authority in action. Nyathi v Member of the Executive Council
is an explicit expression of the Court’s willingness not just to order
action by other branches of government but to involve itself in
overseeing the process of compliance with those orders. Responding
to a pattern of government failure to comply with judgments against
it, Madala J observes that ‘we now have some officials who have
become a law unto themselves and openly violate people’s rights in a
manner that shows disdain for the law.’134 In response to what he sees
as a challenge to the courts135 and the rule of law,136 the Court orders
Parliament to revise the execution of judgment statute and decides
that ‘[i]t has become necessary for this Court to oversee the process
of compliance with court orders and to ensure ultimately that
compliance is both lasting and effective.’137
Kruger v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others is
also a potentially important case, not so much for the correction of
problems in bringing into effect a new system of automobile
insurance, but for the judgments the Court makes about the
President’s ability and its own ability to correct the problem.138
President Mbeki, clearly as a result of oversight, issued a
proclamation which brought into effect the wrong sections of the
Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 19 of 2005. He then issued
another proclamation amending the first one so as to correct the
mistake. The Court concludes that the President could have
withdrawn, but had no power to amend, his own prior, erroneous
proclamation so as to avoid the many legal complications that the first
proclamation would have generated.139 The President’s effort to
amend the first proclamation would have involved such legal
unclarity, in fact, as to be ‘inconsistent with the rule of law.’140 The
Court then itself declares both of the President’s proclamations
132 Section 167. 
133 Section 172. 
134 Nyathi (n 131 above) para 63.
135 Nyathi (n 131 above) para 43.
136 Nyathi (n 131 above) para 48.
137 Nyathi (n 131 above) paras 83 and para 92.
138 [2008] ZACC 17.
139 Kruger (n 139 above) paras 60-68.
140 Kruger (n 139 above) para 64.
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invalid, and orders the President to issue a new one. But what about
all the complications that would have resulted if the right sections of
the Act weren’t treated as having come into effect at the right time,
as the President’s two proclamations sought to accomplish? Those
problems the Court deals with by directing that the President’s new
order will have retrospective effect back to 31 July 2006,141 and by
itself preserving the validity of everything done under the earlier,
invalid proclamations.142 The President’s authority to act is
circumscribed. The Court’s power to fix what has happened is much
freer.
Finally, in Weare and Another v Ndebele NO & Others, the Court
decided that an apartheid-era ‘Ordinance’ (dealing, as it happened,
with gambling in KwaZulu-Natal) constituted a ‘provincial Act’ which
could only be finally held invalid under the Constitution by the
Constitutional Court itself.143 The Court recognised that its decision
about the legal status of this Ordinance might call into question the
process by which other Ordinances had been invalidated over the
years since 1996 – since apparently no such invalidations had been
confirmed by the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless the Court chose
to make no general order on the subject, in light of the ‘cogent
reasons of good government against making an order that may render
proceedings which to all intents and purposes have been concluded,
subject to further challenges and investigation.’144 To refrain from
extending the logic of its own decisions surely made sense here, and
furthermore is an exercise of judicial restraint rather than
overreaching. Still, the power not to follow one’s logic to its ultimate
potential conclusions is an authority that can be used for arbitrariness
as well as for equity. 
It seems to me that the Court is still in the process of deciding how
to regulate its own use of its remedial powers – how, in other words,
to best embody the rule of law in its exercise of its own authority. The
broad conception of constitutional power suggested in the cases I’ve
traversed may echo as well in the Court’s inclination, at least on
occasion, to employ constitutional ‘values’ rather than to parse the
dimensions of constitutional rights.145 But Langa CJ struck quite a
different note in Glenister, when he addressed an argument by the
UDM ‘that, having regard to what it refers to as “the relative
marginalisation of the legislature” and the dangers of one-party
domination, the Court should act because no-one else will.’ For the
Court, the Chief Justice answered, in part, ‘I cannot agree. The role
141 Kruger (n 139 above) para 73. 
142 Kruger (n 139 above) para 80, section (h).
143 Section 167(5).
144 Weare (n 30 above) paras 44-45.
145 See Woolman (n 33 above); Michelman (n 33 above).
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of this Court is established in the Constitution. It may not assume
powers that are not conferred upon it.’146 The debate among the
justices in Merafong Demarcation Forum on the dimensions of
rationality review, a debate in which less demanding interpretations
of rationality prevailed, reflects a similar hesitation.147 I do not mean
to take sides in these debates. Rather, their importance points also to
the importance of the discipline of decision that I have emphasised
here. This discipline is far from the whole of the rule of law, but it is
part of what makes law something other than the free play of personal
preference. In a time when the rule of law broadly understood has
come under such painful challenge from elsewhere in South African
life, the rule of law writ small is also of particular importance.
The discipline of the law is a practice, a habit, a set of
dispositions. No doubt it can only fully be acquired through
experience. But when it is acquired, it provides judges a resource that
is somewhat more than their personal emotional capacity and
balance. The committed performance of the long-marked-out steps of
judging is, even in a world where we recognise the complexity of
human judgment and the urgency of transformative decisions, a
critical part of the path of the law. I think that this path, in its
quotidian fidelity and its generative potential, does enable us to catch
an echo of the infinite.
146 Glenister (n 121 above) para 55. 
147 Moseneke DCJ acknowledges that ‘[a]s a general rule courts should not attempt
to second guess the legislature on the wisdom or otherwise of legislation properly
adopted, nor should they speculate about the motives of the legislators or the
understanding the legislators might have had of the legal consequences of a law
they adopt.’ But in light of the particular events of this case, he concludes that
‘in this case, this Court has the power, and indeed the obligation, to investigate
the reason for’ the Gauteng legislature’s decision. Merafong Demarcation Forum
(n 83 above) paras 171-72. In contrast, Van der Westhuizen J is prepared only to
assume ‘[f]or the purposes of this judgment … that an enquiry into the question
of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature’s appreciation of its constitutional role may
be legitimate and useful.’ Merafong Demarcation Forum (n 83 above) para 74.
While Van der Westhuizen J (for a majority) and Moseneke DCJ (for 4 dissenters)
debate whether or not the legislature correctly understood its constitutional
options in the demarcation dispute, Ngcobo J concludes that ‘this debate is not
germane to the outcome of this case.’ Merafong Demarcation Forum (n 83 above)
para 270. In his view, ‘the fact that one of the considerations that the
[legislative] Committee had regard to may have been unsound, does not detract
from the fact that’ the legislature’s purposes were legitimate and its means
‘rationally related to these purposes.’ Merafong Demarcation Forum (n 83 above)
para 275. It may be a mark of the Court’s struggle with these questions that Van
der Westhuizen J and Ngcobo J join each other’s judgments, even though they
appear to adopt somewhat different approaches to the rationality issue. 
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2 Preparing students for constitutional 
responsibility
Which leads us to the question of what law professors can do to help
our students to become the kind of lawyers who can be such judges.
In a broad sense, the answer is, undoubtedly, that everything we can
teach students about the law contributes to their becoming such
people. But while that answer is reassuring, since it says that each
course we now teach, however structured, contributes something to
the shaping of lawyers and judges for a constitutional state, we should
not be too reassured since even if all our work is of value, it may not
all be as valuable as it should be. 
I take the question of how to prepare students to someday become
judges as being, broadly speaking, the same question as the question
of how to prepare students to become lawyers. Why? Partly because
it is lawyers who become judges — and probably primarily practicing
lawyers as well. In today’s South Africa, academic lawyers can also
become judges, and can and do serve with distinction. I certainly do
not maintain that only practicing lawyers can acquire the qualities
needed for constitutional judging. In fact, it may well be that
academic lawyers and practicing lawyers each, by reason of the
different experience and responsibilities they have had, contribute
distinctive strengths (and weaknesses) to the bench. But it seems
almost inevitable, if only because academic lawyers are not
numerous, that most judges will be drawn from the ranks of
practitioners, and so it is critical that practitioners be ready to judge. 
If lawyers are well qualified to become judges, as I think both our
countries believe, then there must be something about the attributes
of lawyers that is very close to the attributes of judges. Indeed, there
is something, more than one something. Lawyers and judges both
practice legal reasoning, certainly, and legal writing, and so it is
training in judging to teach lawyers these skills. But I’ve already
argued that technical skill is not the highest virtue of constitutional
judging (though it’s certainly an important one). 
I think it is reasonable to say that the set of virtues that I have
described constitutional judges as having are all related to, perhaps
can be summed up as, this: constitutional judges take responsibility
for all the litigants before them, and ultimately for the nation, when
they render decisions. They shoulder a huge responsibility. Lawyers
do not have the same responsibility for the other side and for the
country. But lawyers, one might say, are all in apprenticeship to be
judges in this sense: they too must take responsibility, for their clients
but not just their clients — lawyers take responsibility for their clients
within the law and their duties to it, in short with a measure of
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responsibility for the nation as well. An insightful American ethics
scholar has argued that lawyers in fact should take responsibility for
the justice of their actions in something like the way that judges do
— declining to take steps on behalf of a client if, in context, to do so
would be unjust.148 I don’t go so far as that but still it is evident that
a lawyers’ responsibility is not to their client alone and without
qualification.
There is another sense in which the work of lawyers constitutes
training in constitutional practice. Since, in South Africa, there is only
one law, all of it founded on the constitution, it follows that the law
governing lawyers’ responsibilities to their clients is, equally, founded
on the constitution. It’s also possible that constitutional rights are
directly applicable to individual lawyers. Rights might bind lawyers by
virtue of section 8(1) — since lawyers arguably are organs of state,
functionaries exercising a public power or performing a public
function in terms of any legislation (judges and judicial officers are
excluded from this definition, but not lawyers). Or rights might
constrain lawyers because, under section 8(2), they are ‘applicable,
taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty
imposed by the right.’ It seems clear, regardless of the direct
application question, that the law governing lawyers must comply
with section 34 by facilitating access to courts; that it must respect
human dignity, protected by section 10; that it must honor the privacy
of clients’ communications with lawyers, under section 14; that it
must be free of unfair discrimination that section 9 would bar; and
ultimately that it must contribute to respect, protect, promote and
fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights, as section 7(2) mandates — all
subject to such limitations as section 36 might support as reasonable
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom.
In short, the practice of law is a function shaped by the
constitution. But is there really any serious constitutional question to
be posed about how lawyers should practice law? I think the answer is
that there are many. Let me offer an example.
Let us suppose that a lawyer is speaking with a client. Under South
African law, as under US law, what clients tell their lawyers is, in
general, confidential.149 Thint itself involves the legal professional
privilege; Langa CJ notes that
[t]he applicants did not assert that the Constitution itself protects legal
professional privilege and I therefore do not need to explore that
148 W Simon The practice of justice: A theory of lawyers’ ethics (1998) 138-169.
149 General Council of the Bar of South Africa, Uniform Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 3.2
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question now. We are thus primarily concerned with the common-law
right to legal professional privilege, and with how that right is protected
by the statute.150 But he also notes, in a footnote, ‘the possibility that
the right to legal professional privilege has crystallised into an
implicit constitutional right.’151 We need not resolve the question of
whether this ‘privilege’ is now a constitutional right. It is enough to
consider how the privilege will affect what are, unquestionably,
constitutional rights. 
We know, again, that what clients tell their lawyers is, in general,
confidential. In general, but not always. Let’s focus on criminal cases,
just to put the point as starkly as possible. The General Council of the
Bar devotes an entire Rule, Rule 4.11, to the ‘Position of Counsel
briefed in a criminal case who is informed by his client that he is guilty
of the offence charged.’152 As the Rule explains, an advocate who has
received such a confession is seriously constrained in the defence he
can present. 
He may appropriately argue that the evidence offered by the
prosecution is insufficient to support a conviction and may take
advantage of any legal matter which might relieve the accused of
criminal liability.
But: 
Counsel may not in the proceedings assert that which he knows to be
untrue nor may he connive at or attempt to substantiate a fraud or an
untruth.
Now this raises a question: What does the lawyer say to the client
about this possibility? This question Rule 4.11 answers only in part. It
says that
[w]here a client makes a confession to his counsel either before or
during criminal proceedings, counsel should explain to the client the
basis on which counsel may continue with the case.
Then the client gets to decide, after hearing about that ‘basis,’
whether to continue with the counsel or not. At least as far as the
Rules indicate, the client who wants a more wholehearted defense is
perfectly free to discharge that counsel, and then go on to hire
another and this time falsely maintain his innocence. It is not, as far
as I know, a crime to lie to your lawyer. As long as the client stayed
off the witness stand he would not be guilty of perjury — and might
150 Thint (n 56 above) para 183 (footnote omitted).
151 Thint (n 56 above) para 183 n123 (judgment of Langa CJ). 
152 General Council of the Bar of South Africa, Uniform Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 4.11.
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get a stronger defense. Clients dependent on state-funded counsel
may not be able to shop for a new lawyer in this fashion — but richer
accused might well find it worth their while. (Whether this outcome
should be seen as engaging the right of access to the courts — via that
second counsel — or as generating unfair discrimination between rich
and poor accused is beyond the scope of this article.)
Such problems arise, however, only after the client has confessed.
The Rule does not tell us whether counsel should explain the
provisions of Rule 4.11 before the client utters his indiscreet
confession. What should the lawyer say at that stage? Does she say,
‘Please tell me about the charges against you? Remember that
whatever you tell me is confidential’? If she does, and the client
admits his guilt, and the lawyer informs him that she will now be able
to defend him only in a constrained way, he might well feel that the
confidentiality he enjoyed was less complete than advertised. He
might, indeed, feel deceived. Perhaps it would be fair to say that this
series of events amounted to a breach of his dignity.
Or does she say, instead, ‘Please tell me about the charges against
you. Remember that whatever you tell me is confidential, but keep in
mind that if you tell me you are guilty, I won’t be able to argue that
you are actually innocent.’ Though an accurate (though incomplete)
statement of the law, surely a client’s dignity requires the lawyer to
explain the law governing his situation. Another Rule, Rule 4.6, seems
to endorse this proposition, though not particularly comprehensively.
It says that
[c]ounsel is entitled to advise his client whether any proposed conduct
will contravene the law ... [but] is clearly not entitled to devise a
scheme which involves his client in the commission of any offence.153
Explaining the limits on confidentiality before they come into play
doesn’t seem to me to amount to ‘devising a scheme’ to involve the
client in an offence. It does, however, invite the client to
manufacture a false story so as to be able to offer a more vigorous
defense. That hardly seems to serve the interest in justice, and may
in fact lead to the lawyer putting on testimony which is false – though
she will not know it. 
Now this warning about the dangers of telling the truth would
clearly be unlawful if lawyers are duty-bound to seek and obtain the
truth from their clients. But are they? We can take for granted that
153 General Council of the Bar of South Africa, Uniform Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 4.6. 
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lawyers are not permitted to lie to courts.154 But are they obliged to
seek the truth? I don’t find that statement, in so many words, in the
rules of the bar. Suppose we infer, however, that lawyers should seek
the truth from their clients, in the service of what Rule 3.2 calls their
‘overriding duty not to mislead the Court.’155 How hard are they
supposed to look for the truth? The answer surely isn’t that each
lawyer is to adopt the perspective of the prosecutor with respect to
her own client. Prosecutors, or in civil cases the lawyers for the other
side, play that function. The lawyer dealing with her own client may
want to learn the truth from him, but she must decide when she has
done so, and surely she should lean towards accepting the truth of
what her client tells her rather than adopting the stance of the
opposing advocate. And so, presumably, there are degrees of
inquisition that the lawyer ordinarily ought not to adopt; a benefit of
the doubt that each lawyer should ordinarily give her own client. Why?
Perhaps as a matter of dignity; perhaps as a matter of promoting
access to the courts; perhaps in the service of other constitutional
values.
Suppose, now, that in some way the lawyer views what the client
faces as unjust. Suppose the lawyer knows, for example, that a client
faces cut-off of her already very small government benefits if it turns
out that the client is receiving any income at all ‘on the side.’ This
may not be an issue under South African benefits law; it assuredly is
in the US. How far should the lawyer probe to find out if the client is
receiving such income? What if the lawyer knows that as a practical
matter no one can survive on the benefits available, and so everyone
is likely to be scrabbling together some scraps of additional income on
the side? What if the application for benefits that the lawyer will
assist the client in filling out must affirm complete disclosure of all
income? How hard should the lawyer push to find out every bit of
income? Does the injustice she perceives justify her not pushing all
that hard, perhaps carefully avoiding learning what she suspects she
might hear if she asked the wrong question? Should she explain the
law to the client so that the client can work out for himself what the
right answer is, and provide it? Should she (as a colleague of mine,
Kate Kruse, has suggested) ask the client to reason with her about the
justice of the law in question?
In answering all of these questions, the lawyer is, essentially,
practicing the constitutional law of lawyering. Or, rather, the lawyer
perhaps should be seen to be making the constitutional law of
154 General Council of the Bar of South Africa, Uniform Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 3.2. 
155 General Council of the Bar of South Africa, Uniform Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 3.2. 
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lawyering. The reflective practice of law, understood this way, is very
much a training in the tasks of constitutional judging. 
The issues I’ve just described are, I hope, ones that intrigue you
as subjects for scholarship. They have intrigued me as subjects for
scholarship; I’ve written at length on the issues of what lawyers
should say to their clients, as have many other clinical scholars in the
United States.156 Writing about these issues, and teaching about them
to our students, are contributions to the constitutional practice of
law.
But to ask students to think about issues is not the same as asking
them to take responsibility for resolving them. The task of the judge
is not to decide matters in the abstract, but in the concrete and
particular. The task of the lawyer is not to reflect as a philosopher on
morality and law, nor (contrary to the injunction of Justice Holmes
that I quoted early in this essay) ‘to follow the existing body of dogma
into its highest generalisation by the help of jurisprudence,’157 but to
make lawful, moral decisions in the representation of clients. In
short, the ultimate training ground for law students as they prepare
to be lawyers and judges is the practice of law itself. This is, of
course, an argument for clinics and similar teaching approaches.158 It
is not an argument for South Africa only; on the contrary, the same
considerations point in the same way in the United States. Over the
past few years, legal educators in the US have expressed greater
concern that they are not yet contributing as much as they should to
the preparation of their students for the practice of law as they
should. Recognising the strength of law schools’ training in what it
calls the ‘cognitive apprenticeship’ for lawyering, the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching has recently urged in a
volume on legal education that law schools must do much more to
contribute to their students’ apprenticeship in the ‘skills’ of
lawyering and, perhaps most pertinently, in the ‘values’ of lawyering
as well.159 
156 Many of the issues just sketched in the text are addressed, at length, in a chapter
entitled ‘Truth and consequences’ in Ellmann et al (n 78 above) 227-78.
157 Much of Holmes’ own passion seems to have been directed to exactly this quest
for ‘legal insight and intellectual achievement,’ Pillsbury (n 28 above) 338. But it
is striking that his perception of ‘the infinite’ as immanent in the path of the law
may have grown from ‘the discovery of some deep—and previously
unfulfilled—love’ for another person. Pillsbury (n 28 above) 361 n 45 quoting MJ
Horwitz The transformation of American law, 1870-1960 (1992) 143.
158 On South Africa’s law clinics, see W de Klerk ‘University law clinics in South
Africa’ (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 929.
WM Sullivan et al Educating lawyers: Preparation for the profession of law
(2007). See also Roy Stuckey et al Best practices for legal education: A vision and
a road map (2007), available at http://www.cleaweb.org/documents/best
practices/best_practices-full.pdf. For an argument that one way to prepare
students for the practice of law is to make one year of law school the legal
159
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The upshot of this argument is that South African law schools, like
American ones, may well need to focus somewhat less on the
accumulation of doctrinal instruction and somewhat more on the
step-by-step engagement of students in apprenticeship for practice. I
do not want to offer specific suggestions on this score. However; it is
difficult enough to envision how to reshape American legal education
— which is graduate education, and which leads directly to practice —
and I do not want to pretend to have a blueprint for analogous efforts
here. But I hope I have shown you that constitutional judging is bound
up with the values and the character of those who do it; that
constitutional lawyering is training for constitutional judging; and
accordingly that preparation for constitutional lawyering must be a
key focus of legal education in a constitutional state. To that degree,
I’ve sought to mark the path of the law.
159 equivalent of the ‘rotations’ through practice settings that are an integral part of
medical school, see S Ellmann ‘The clinical year’ 53 New York Law School Law
Review 877 (2009).
